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I will explore the three foundations for union strength and success that were 
present in Waterloo: organization and representation, political activism/awakening, and 
community outreach. Unions’ solidarity and strength can be attributed to these 
foundations, but they also created limitations that led to the local unions’ decline in 
Waterloo.  
Part I focuses on the relationship between organization and representation and the 
political awakening in 1947. It argues that Waterloo unions’ political activism from 1947 
to 1964 expanded the local’s presence in the community. Campaigning, electing 
candidates who were members of a union, and developing a labor agenda resulted in 
positive growth for the locals. After the election of 1964, labors’ new found majority with 
the Democrat Party resulted in limited policy changes. It splintered the locals’ shared 
political agenda that weakened Waterloo unions’ solidarity in the community.  
Part II looks at the third foundation, community outreach. It argues the UAW 
Local 838 “Brown Bag” Committee, a social aid organization, did more than provide 
food for needy community members. It served a social and cultural role in the community 
during the severe economic downturn of the 1980s. Having exposed this problem, the 
union was eventually replaced in solving it, by a better funded agent of the local 
government. Waterloo unions’ built a foundation from organization and representation, 
political activism, and community outreach that was successful throughout the twentieth 
century. However, that success led to members diminishing the collectiveness of the 
 
union, along with the impacts of the Cold War, the Great Society, the Civil Rights 
Movement and the Vietnam War, contributed to the decline of labor in Waterloo.       
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Gene Condon, former President of the UAW Local 838, recalled in a 1981 
interview his first encounter with unions after returning to work from military service in 
1948.  He stated:   
The headlines in every paper you’d pick up would be talking about communism 
within the CIO. I’d never worked where there was a union prior to that time, and 
when I started at the plant the departmental steward talked to me every day and 
tried to get me to join the union. And I says, “I wouldn’t have any part of the 
communistic rats,” and just didn’t want any part of it. I was fresh out of service. 
He talked to me every day, and three weeks later I finally joined the union. I told 
him, “I’m going to every single union meeting, and I’m going to be looking for 
Communists.” And, you know, after thirty-three years of being active in the local 
and attending every meeting and attending meetings all over the country, I’ve yet 
to see my first Communist.1  
 
Condon’s memory after thirty-three years showed the influence of Cold War politics on 
Waterloo and across the nation. The United States, during the 1950s thru 1970s, faced 
unrest and social angst. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s introduced his “Great Society” 
platform, the Civil Rights Movement swept through the South, and the Vietnam War 
sparked protests across the country. The nation shifted by the 1970s with the rise of the 
New Right and conservative leaders and industries shift to the Sun Belt region.2 By the 
early 1980s, most blue-collar cities, including Waterloo, faced a severe economic 
downturn. Industries closed production and moved South or overseas causing 
 1 Gene Condon, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 11, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. 
 
2 Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the 
Tragedy of American Labor (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 2-4. 
                                                          
2 
 
unemployment to rise.3 These movements and national events questioned the 
community’s stability along with organized labor’s future existence.  
 Waterloo has been a “Factory City” due to its many industries. The most 
prominent of which were Rath Packing Company and Waterloo Gasoline Engine 
Company, later incorporated into its current name, the John Deere Waterloo Works. Both 
organizations struggled to unionize, and by the outbreak of World War II each had 
established a strong local union presence through the United Packinghouse Workers of 
America (UPWA) and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America; International Union (UAW), respectfully.4  Other trades and crafts 
workers also organized in the early twentieth-century, transforming Waterloo’s “factory 
city” into a “union city” where union locals became tied to the community. In Waterloo, 
these included the city’s barbers, bartenders, fire fighters (IAFF), electricians (IBEW), 
carpenters, Teamsters, and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME).  
 Unions, specifically the UPWA Local 46 and UAW Local 838, grew and 
flourished in Waterloo throughout the fifties and sixties. They succeeded in three key 
areas that made each a strong and successful union. The first priority of a union is to be a 
strong bargaining agent for its members in order to produce a strong contract between the 
worker and management. Local 46 and Local 838 solidified their strength after lengthy 
3 Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity & Survival: An Oral History of Iowa Labor in the Twentieth 
Century (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1993), 11. 
 
4 Sister John Marie Daly, “History of Unionization in Waterloo, Iowa” (master’s thesis, Creighton 
University, 1962), 3, 18-19.  
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and continuous strikes in 1948 at Rath and 1950 at John Deere. Their solidarity led to 
new long-term contracts focused on workplace safety, employee benefits, and wage 
increases.  
Political activism or sense of awakening also stimulated Waterloo unions’ 
strength and success. It arose during the 1947 right to work debate, at the state and 
federal levels, prompting union leaders and members to become politically active for 
their own advancement. The rise of political activism created a unified labor agenda 
focused on electing pro-labor candidates and labor leaders to political office in Des 
Moines and Black Hawk County, including Waterloo – the county seat, which culminated 
in the 1964 election. Political activity provided a secondary responsibility for the union 
beyond contractual negotiations and grievances. The third area is community outreach. 
An active union needs the community’s support for it to be strong and successful. In 
Waterloo, Local 838 and Local 46 provided programs and committees to improve the 
social welfare of the community and address problems that were not being addressed by 
the city. These programs assisted youth, race relations, food shortages, medical 
necessities, and layoffs. Organization, political activism, and community outreach were 
the three key areas foundational to Waterloo unions’ strength and success.  
This foundation promoted growth, but divided the workforce from the union. By 
the mid-sixties, the United States faced unrest from the rise of anti-Vietnam protest, the 
struggle for civil rights, and the continuous threat of nuclear war. The success of a three- 
or five-year contract agreements resulted in inactivity of union members between 
negotiations. By not bargaining every year, the question - what role does a union play 
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between negotiations – arose. One answer to that question was political activism. Union 
membership increased its involvement in political campaigns and voter turnout in state 
and local elections. It created a unified political agenda. However, it peaked after the 
election of 1964. Union locals’ succeeded in electing local and state candidates favorable 
to labor’s agenda. That success, however, did not equal legislative results. Differing 
interest from local and national union leaders led to the splintering of labor’s collective 
agenda. Even the union locals’ success in providing social welfare programs were 
diminished after being displaced by city led programs or third-party institutions.  
Labor historians have not primarily focused on the relationship between union 
locals and the community it represents. Their research generally focuses on the rise and 
the fall of unions from the Gilded Age to the rise of what scholars call neoliberalism in 
the 1980s. Few explore the cultural and social connections between union locals and their 
communities or look at the way these connections influence labor’s success or failures. 
My research focusses on the political, social and cultural forces that connected 
Waterloo’s local unions to the community. Union locals were active in Waterloo, most 
notably from 1950s to 1990s, focused on political involvement and providing social 
welfare services. Some of the social programs sponsored by the Waterloo locals include: 
youth programs - Boy and Girl Scouts Troops, the Boys & Girls Club, YMCA camps, 
and Teenage Jive Joint; minority institutions - Crosby Center, and Equal Employment 
Commission; elderly programs; and general welfare programs – the free community 
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blood bank, food drives, and the United Way/United Appeal/Community Chest.5 Unions 
held positive association with the community of Waterloo, in part, because of its work 
providing and supporting these types of programs. However, this relationship deteriorated 
through the late-twentieth century due to three factors. First, union locals splintered its 
unified political agenda after the Democrat landslide election in 1964. This left Waterloo 
divided between the multiple locals seeking influence in the community and a Democrat 
Party regaining prominence in Iowa. Second, labor unions spearheaded many social 
programs addressing issues not being handled by the city of Waterloo. When the city 
took over responsibility of the unions’ sponsored programs, the locals were relegated 
from its leadership role. This diminished union’s presence in the community. Third, the 
1980s opened with a downturn in the economy that forced labor to withdraw from the 
community in order to sustain services for its members. These factors greatly impacted 
the success Waterloo unions experienced in the 1950s through 1990s, along with national 
events, that led to the unions’ decline. 
The term “community” is defined as a city or town of people who actively 
recognize their common culture, technological, institutional, and economical traits. 
Historiographical analysis of local influences on unions heavily focuses on political 
5 A. W. “Rusty” Lubert and Ruth Lubert, Waterloo, Joint Interview by Merle Davis, July 2, 1981, 
Iowa Labor History Oral Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 18-37.; Paul M. Larsen, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 15, 1981, 
Iowa Labor History Oral Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 33-36.; Roosevelt Taylor, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 8, 1981, 
Iowa Labor History Oral Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 11-15.; Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity & Survival: An Oral History of Iowa 
Labor in the Twentieth Century (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1993), 294-299. 
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context. Some historians argue that unions’ power comes from the locals rather than 
being national leaders. They suggest that the absence of local leadership is a key reason 
for the decline of labor by the 1980s. Gordon L. Clark uses this analysis in Union and 
Communities Under Siege: American Communities and the Crisis of Organized Labor 
(1989). He argues that industrial unions, during the latter portions of the Cold War Era, 
faced increased hostility due to the notion that “unions are accountable for the prosperity 
(or lack thereof) of communities and regions across the United States.” Clark suggests 
that the “crisis of organized labor is more than the loss of membership.” He traces labor’s 
decline to a local realization that “the welfare of unions is no longer consistent with the 
welfare of communities.”6 His research presents an opportunity to re-explore the 
fundamental elements that were consistent between a community and the local unions 
and how they shifted during the strong and turbulent years of the mid- to late-twentieth 
century. 
Gary M. Fink supports Clark’s interpretation. He also challenges research on the 
AFL and concepts of voluntarism arguing that while these studies are accurate at 
“portraying the convictions of the AFL leadership, they largely fail to reflect the attitudes 
of local and state labor leaders.”7 He suggests that local labor was more successful than 
its national leaders due to its focused responsibilities:   
 
6 Gordon L. Clark, Unions and Communities Under Siege: American Communities and the Crisis 
of Organized Labor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 241. 
 
7 Gary M. Fink, Labor’s Search for Political Order: The Political Behavior of the Missouri Labor 
Movement 1890-1940 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 165. 
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Local labor was much closer to react to immediate economic and political realities 
of working-class America.  Unlike the national leaders of organized labor, they 
tended to react to immediate problems and seldom thought in long-range terms or 
in terms of the labor movement as a whole…Moreover, in a very literal sense, 
local labor organizations were much more democratic than either the AFL or 
various union bureaucracies.8  
 
A community’s influence on labor is more than political rhetoric, workplace struggle, or 
shopfloor militancy.  
 A third leading labor scholar, James A. Craft, recognizes a union’s connection to 
the community provides a source of power or leverage that should be fostered and 
maintained in order to apply sufficient pressure on management when the proper situation 
arises, i.e. negotiations and contractual agreements. Craft identifies four union-
community relationships that could be fostered: the extensive community, community 
subgroups, community action groups, and government official or units. The extensive 
community relies on the entire local community working with the union to create a strong 
alliance against both local and national management. This practice can be narrowed by 
working with community subgroups who often are “issue-oriented or have a narrow focal 
interest.”9 Community action groups differ from community subgroups due to their grass-
roots and active organizational structure. Lastly, government official or units can change 
rules and laws to benefit unions, but this will only occur if the official sees political gains 
8 Fink, Labor’s Search for Political Order, 181. 
 
9 James A. Craft, “The Community as a Source of Union Power,” Journal of Labor Research 11, 
no. 2 (June 1990): 149. 
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from their support.10 Within these four groups, unions could build coalitions that would 
help secure a strong labor presence within their community. 
  Even though these relationships were identified within labor communities, Craft 
argues they were not effectively maintained by the unions. According to many 
researchers and union members, unions by their nature are collective bargaining agents. 
Any activity outside this responsibility, including building community groups, is not a 
priority or an interest for its members. During the 1950s and into the 1960s, the AFL-CIO 
established a national and local community services program. Yet, as Craft suggests, 
“Potentially, these programs could be the basis for labor-community alliances, but unions 
have not been effective in transforming such activities into focused good will or 
systematic ties to the community with power implications.”11 He concludes that an 
effective union-community relation is only active during a crisis once traditional union 
procedures have failed.12  
John Hinshaw and Paul Le Blanc’s edited collection U.S. Labor in the Twentieth 
Century (2000) focuses on the evolution of capitalism and the diminished labor market 
through stages of “structural adjustments” and “lean and mean” practices at the expense 
of employees.13 They argue, along with David Montgomery, Paul Buhle and other 
10 Craft, “The Community as a Source of Union Power,” 150. 
 
11 Craft, “The Community as a Source of Union Power,” 154. 
 
12 Craft, “The Community as a Source of Union Power,” 156. 
 
13 Paul Le Blanc and John Hinshaw, “Why the Working Class Still Matters,” in U.S. Labor in the 
Twentieth Century: Studies in Working-Class Struggles and Insurgency, ed. John Hinshaw and Paul Le 
Blanc (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000), 13. 
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historians, that capitalism hinders and degrades the American workforce, while benefiting 
the owner over the worker.14 This system “is deeply committed to inequality: the few 
owners of the economy must be enriched by employing the labor of the many who own 
nothing but their own labor-power.”15 Le Blanc and Hinshaw recognizes the negative 
influence employers’ and unions have had on people of color, women, and workers of 
low-class status. Their analysis of labor history “involves the ability to look beyond the 
institution of the trade union, recognizing that the trade union is not necessarily all there 
is to ‘organized labor,’ just as the working class and the class struggle are not confined 
simply to the membership of the organized labor movement.”16 This argument is widely 
adopted by new labor historians. Their works, introduced in the 1960s, challenged the 
“Commons School of Thought” or old labor history led by economist, John R. 
Commons.17 
14 See David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and 
American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Paul Buhle, Taking 
Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999); Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and 
Economy in the History of the US Working Class (New York: Verso, 1999); Elizabeth Faue, Community of 
Suffering & Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991); and Deborah Fink, Cutting into the Meatpacking Line: Workers 
and Change in the Rural Midwest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1998).  
 
15 Le Blanc and Hinshaw, “Why the Working Class Still Matters,” 21. 
 
16 Le Blanc and Hinshaw, “Why the Working Class Still Matters,” 22. 
 
17 Jack Barbash, “John R. Commons: Pioneer of Labor Economics” Monthly Labor Review 122, 
no. 5 (May 1989): 44-49.  Commons’s notable works are: Institutional Economics (New York: Macmillan, 
1934), Industrial Goodwill (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1919), Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles 
of Labor Legislation (New York: Harper and Bros., 1936), The Economics of Collective Action (New York, 
Macmillan, 1950), Trade Unionism and Labor Problems (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1921), & Labor and 
Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1923).  Commons also produced influential edited works including 
History of Labor in the United States, vol. 1-4 (New York: Macmillan, 1918-1935) & A Documentary 
History of American Industrial Society (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1910).  He influenced the works of 
Edwin E. Witte, “father of social security,” John A. Fitch, The Steel Workers, Herbert Simon and Oliver 
Williamson. 
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Andrew Battista builds on new labor history of Montgomery, Le Blanc and 
Hinshaw, and Buhle with his 1991 article, “Political Divisions in Organized Labor, 1968-
1988.” Battista focuses on the relationship between national and local leaders as a source 
to the labor movement’s strength and weakness. He argues that four interrelated issues 
during these twenty years challenged union solidarity: the presidential election of 1968, 
the rise of new social movements (antiwar, civil rights, feminism), foreign policy and an 
international focus, and the power structure of the AFL-CIO. Battista notes, “The origin 
and significance of this split in the labor movement lie in the expansion of the social base 
and policy agenda of the Democratic Party liberalism during the 1960s and 1970s, which 
was resisted by the AFL-CIO leadership but supported by a bloc of dissident unions and 
labor leaders.”18  
Buhle outlines the AFL-CIO leadership challenges that supports Battista’s 
analysis of union leadership’s disconnection with their locals.  He argues that the AFL-
CIO “leaders had treated themselves as partners with the elite and constantly fortified 
their positions in the midst of apathy, sealing themselves off from challenges.”19 Those 
challenges, as mentioned by Clark, Fink, Le Blanc and Hinshaw, Montgomery, and 
Battista, were an opportunity to strengthen union solidarity.  However, “members lost, 
diminished not only by the virtually unchecked rise of a powerful system breaking down 
the real options for autonomy in daily economic life but also degraded by the narrowing 
 
18 Andrew Battista, “Political Division in Organized Labor, 1968-1988,” Polity 24, no. 2 (Winter 
1991): 174. 
 
19 Buhle, Taking Care of Business, 251-252. 
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of the movement’s purpose from human emancipation to special favors for the 
connected,” Buhle concludes.20   
Kevin Boyle and Clayton Sinyai offer different perspectives on political history 
by focusing on union influences from the New Deal legislation rather than the leadership 
challenges in the late twentieth-century.  Boyle challenges the paradigm that organized 
labor, in the Cold War Era, received the necessary means to protect itself and maintain its 
political influence. He believes the labor-liberal alliance, “champions of the forgotten 
American,” were trapped in a New Deal system that did not fully recognize the changes 
in “the realignment of partisan loyalties and the restructuring of the American state.”21 
These leaders’ inability to adapt to the changing environment impacted the success of 
unions. Sinyai supports Boyle’s concerns that labor depended on the New Deal, but 
approaches the argument differently in School of Democracy: A political history of the 
American labor movement (2006). He argues that the United Sates labor movement is in 
a cyclical structure, rather than Boyle’s use of a traditional timeline, and “finds itself in 
the world before the New Deal…. [Where] our nation is home to a burgeoning class of 
working poor.”22 American labor is not continuing with the New Deal from FDR, but 
rather in an environment that might result in a new New Deal legislation, which will 
support growth for another labor movement. 
20 Buhle, Taking Care of Business, 263. 
 
21 Kevin Boyle, ed., Organized Labor and American Politics 1894-1994: The Labor-Liberalism 
Alliance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 11. 
 
22 Clayton Sinyai, Schools of Democracy: A Political History of the American Labor Movement 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 226-227. 
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   Sinyai offers a rare optimistic conclusion for organized labor as many historians 
lean towards a pessimistic or cynical view. Historians, following the latter perspective, do 
not fully write the obituary of organized labor. Many leave open-ended conclusions 
hinting at the final days of labor unions. The argument - national labors disconnect with 
its locals affected unions’ solidarity – offers an opportunity to further explore the role of 
local unions. The narrative around unions’ successes or failures and its relation with the 
community should be expanded, specifically in Iowa.       
To understand Iowa’s labor history, researchers and students must start with 
Shelton Stromquist.  Stromquist’s work has influenced numerous articles, often published 
in the Annals of Iowa, along with several dissertations. Stromquist, emeritus professor at 
the University of Iowa, developed Iowa’s labor history with his leadership in organizing 
the Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO Labor History Oral Project. This project became 
Solidarity & Survival (1993), a book that provides rich, personal accounts of labor in the 
twentieth century with limited interpretation and analytical contexts. Stromquist lets the 
oral histories provide their own interpretation focused on the social movements of labor 
relations with management and worker. However, his analysis does not strongly highlight 
the local community-union relations in Iowa.  
Bruce Fehn’s 1995 article, “‘The Only Hope We Had’: United Packinghouse 
Workers Local 46 and the Struggle for Racial Equality in Waterloo, Iowa, 1948-1960,” 
and Matthew M. Mettler’s 2014 article, “AFL Community Unionism: The Des Moines 
Department Store Strike of 1939,” utilizes Stromquist’s research and the interviews under 
the Iowa Labor History Oral Project (ILHOP) to expand on racial and community 
13 
 
consciousness in Iowa before the national Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. Fehn 
analyzes Waterloo and the United Packinghouse Workers Local 46 at the Rath Packing 
Company, while Mettler looks at the AFL’s influence on the service industry in Des 
Moines.  
Both Fehn and Mettler notice a significant percentage of each community 
supported their union’s efforts to integrate the workplace.  “While breaking down the 
structure of workplace inequality, Local 46 members also took the fight for racial 
equality into the community. They converted the union into a bastion of the civil rights 
struggle in Waterloo,” Fehn concludes.23 Mettler suggests that unions helped shift Des 
Moines’s “labor movement away from its history of racism by creating an opportunity for 
union consciousness to trump racial consciousness.”24 This shift in each community 
evolves out of a union’s relation with their community and working for solidarity not 
only in the workplace but also in their communities.   
In 1997, Stromquist and Marvin Bergman, SHSI Annals of Iowa editor and 
adjunct professor of history at the University of Iowa, published their co-edited collection 
of works on the meatpacking industry in the twentieth-century. The two labor scholars 
came up with a new interpretation, arguing that the decline of UPWA in Iowa and the 
Midwest was fostered by the loss of “union memory.” This decline came about because 
23 Bruce Fehn, “‘The Only Hope We Had’: United Packinghouse Workers Local 46 and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality in Waterloo, Iowa, 1948-1960,” The Annals of Iowa 54, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 
213. 
 
24 Matthew M. Mettler, “AFL Community Unionism: The Des Moines Department Store Strike of 
1939,” Labor Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas 11, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 101. 
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of the transition from a community based workforce to an internationalized one. A “sense 
of community,” whether based on union, race, class, or gender, served as the foundation 
to union success. Without this factor, unions could not have flourished in the immediate 
post-Depression years.25  
Wilson J. Warren, who wrote a chapter in Stromquist and Bergman’s edited 
works, also published his research on Ottumwa’s meatpacking labor history in the 
twentieth-century, Struggling with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor relations, unionism, and 
politics in the rural Midwest since 1877 (2000) and Tied to the Great Packing Machine: 
The Midwest and Meatpacking (2007). Warren finds that unions “were distinctive to one 
community” and this relationship demanded stronger continuity in its study. He argues 
that “this intensive focus on one community illuminates the dynamics of the particular 
personalities and ideas involved in creating the various forms of labor relations” and 
should be expanded to similar packing communities.26 The suggestion for further study 
should not solely focus on packing communities, but to all unions in Iowa’s rural and 
urban communities. 
I will explore the three foundations for union strength and success that were 
present in Waterloo: organization and representation, political activism/awakening, and 
community outreach. Unions’ solidarity and strength can be attributed to these 
25 Shelton Stromquist, and Marvin Bergman, eds., Unionizing the Jungles: Labor and Community 
in the Twentieth-Century Meatpacking Industry (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1997), 10-11. 
 
26 Wilson J. Warren, Struggling with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor Relations, Unionism, and Politics in 
the Rural Midwest Since 1877 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2000), 2-3. 
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foundations, but they also created limitations that led to the local unions’ decline in 
Waterloo.  
Part I focuses on the relationship between organization and representation and the 
political awakening in 1947. It argues that Waterloo unions’ political activism from 1947 
to 1964 expanded the local’s presence in the community. Campaigning, electing 
candidates who were members of a union, and developing a labor agenda resulted in 
positive growth for the locals. After the election of 1964, labors’ new found majority with 
the Democrat Party resulted in limited policy changes. It splintered the locals’ shared 
political agenda that weakened Waterloo unions’ solidarity in the community.  
Part II looks at the third foundation, community outreach. It argues the UAW 
Local 838 “Brown Bag” Committee, a social aid organization, did more than provide 
food for needy community members. It served a social and cultural role in the community 
during the severe economic downturn of the 1980s. Having exposed this problem, the 
union was eventually replaced in solving it, by a better funded agent of the local 
government. This too decreased the union’s visibility and role in the community. 
Waterloo unions’ built a foundation from organization and representation, political 
activism, and community outreach that was successful throughout the twentieth century. 
However, that success led to members diminishing the collectiveness of the union, along 
with the impacts of the Cold War, the Great Society, the Civil Rights Movement and the 
Vietnam War, contributed to the decline of labor in Waterloo.       
16 
PART I 
EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL POWER, 1940-1970 
 
 Marlene Kruger, president of the Machinists Union, Local 1373 who served on 
the executive board of the Black Hawk Union Council, offered her views on the role of 
politics in unions in a 1991 interview: 
I don’t think there’s any way that you can separate labor unions from politics. 
Down through the years the people in the plants never wanted to hear about 
politics and they kind of wanted you to just stay away from them when it was 
time for elections. But down through the years they have finally realized that from 
the time you get up in the morning and you turn on the light to get dressed, that 
everything you do through the entire day…is regulated by legislation. And we 
have found that during the Nixon years and the Reagan years that things got really 
rough for us because those people were not labor minded.1 
 
Kruger’s reflection shows a political awakening in rank-in-file members in Waterloo. The 
success and strength of a union requires three foundational areas: organization and 
representation, a political awakening that evolves to activism, and community outreach.  
This chapter argues Waterloo unions’ political awakening led to their decline after 
the 1964 election due to the limited policy changes from political victories and the 
splintering of a shared political agenda. The local unions successfully established 
political activism with its members, but, once awakened and active, the unions could not 
keep a unified force. It was in part inhibited by national issues such as the Civil Rights 
1 Marlene Kruger, Waterloo, Interview by Dan Holub, June 27, 1991, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
31-32. 
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Movement, the rise of the New Right, the Vietnam War, and the continued strained 
relations with the Soviet Union.2 
Organized labor, along with the country, faced national adversity. Three decades 
before the sixties, the United States experienced its toughest economic crisis with The 
Great Depression. A quarter of Americans were without jobs, thousands of banks 
collapsed, and production slowed by a third of the levels in 1929. The newly sworn in 
president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, along with a compliant Congress, quickly implemented 
his New Deal policies focused on recovery, relief, and reform. One of his earliest 
measures, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, targeted labor-
management relations. 
A key provision of the NIRA granted the National Recovery Administration, 
headed by former General Hugh S. Johnson, to create “codes of fair competition” that 
were implemented, voluntarily, industry wide with the goal of establishing fair prices, 
fair working conditions, and fair profits. Within nine months, the NRA established over 
500 new codes of fair practices that were adopted by various industries. Public awareness 
grew when participating companies displayed the NRA Blue Eagle in their places of 
business. If a company or business did not have the Blue Eagle displayed, it could be 
boycotted.3 The legislation also included a labor caveat through Article 7a that allowed 
2Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the 
Tragedy of American Labor (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 8-16. 
 
3 National Archives, “National Industrial Recovery Act (1933)” in “Our Documents: 100 
Milestone Documents from the National Archives,” National Archives, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=66 (accessed August 2016). 
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employees the right to organize and collective bargain. In addition, it prevented 
employers restricting or restraining employees’ union membership.4  
 According to Melvin Dubofsky, NIRA did not sufficiently help with the recovery 
or reducing prices. Coal miners and garment workers quickly benefited from the new 
legislation due to their early presence in the workforce. Other industries - including auto 
workers, steel workers, rubber workers, teamsters, and longshoremen - were not able to 
gain ground in collective bargaining. The legislation only added to the economic 
situation, instead of improving it.5 The NIRA, subsequent to other New Deal legislation, 
did not survive constitutional review of the United States Supreme Court. In May 1935, 
the Court ruled unanimously in the case Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 
that Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers to the President in violation 
of Article I, Section 8 and Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce. The 
Justices argued the NRA “codes of fair practice” were actual laws unconstitutionally 
approved by the President.6 
 U.S. Senator Robert Wagner (D-New York) pressed to revive the labor 
protections previously offered under Section 7a in his sponsored bill the National Labor 
Relation Act (NLRA). This act stipulated that employees had the right to “self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
4 Melvyn Dubofsky, ed., American Labor since the New Deal (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1971), 5. 
 
5 Dubofsky, American Labor, 6-7. 
 
6 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection.”7 Major provisions 
of the act included: the formation of the National Labor Relation Board, a list of unfair 
labor practices, bargaining agreements for increase in pay and workplace safety, and 
approved strike practices.8 Unlike the NRA, the governing board under the NLRA, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), had sufficient authority to engage in 
arbitration, guarantee fair and democratic elected unions, and penalized unfair labor 
practices. Just two years later, the Wagner Act was before the Supreme Court to test its 
constitutional validity. In a five-four decision, the Court ruled that Congress had the right 
to regulate labor relations under the Commerce Clause.9  
This decision cemented labor’s legal right to organize collectively across the 
country. Factories in Waterloo and across the country formed labor coalitions knowing 
they had the official support and strength of the federal government behind their 
movement. In 1933, John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works first organized under the AFL 
Federal Union. It proved inefficient, because the union was limited to certain skilled 
trades and not inclusive to all factory workers. With the forming of the Committee for 
Industrial Organization in November of 1935 (later changed to Congress of Industrial 
7 National Archives, “National Labor Relations Act (1935)” in “Our Documents: 100 Milestone 
Documents from the National Archives,” National Archives, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=67 (accessed August 2016). 
 
8 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2015). 
 
9 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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Organization), it created a battleground for bargaining control between CIO, AFL and 
other union organizations.  
Between 1937 and 1939, four additional unions sought to organize the Waterloo 
Tractor Works: the Steel Workers (SWOC), the Farm Equipment Workers (FE), the 
International Association of Machinists of the AFL (IAM), and the UAW-CIO. By April 
1940, the NLRB received sufficient support for two of the four unions, IAM and UAW, 
to hold an election for bargaining agent. Neither union reached a majority. After the 
election the two unions compromised and agreed that the UAW could organize the 
Waterloo Tractor Works, if they withdrew from organizing Solar Aircraft of Des Moines. 
The International UAW chartered Local 838 on April 30, 1941 without holding another 
election by the NLRB. The next election came on May 22, 1942, and this time the UAW 
was the only union on the ballot.10 
 Another factory to organize during World War II was the Rath Packing Company. 
In 1938, the CIO Packinghouse Workers’ Organizing Committee (PWOC) helped Rath 
workers quietly organize the company even though it was not a major target of the group. 
PWOC targeted the “Big Four” packers: Armour, Swift, Wilson, and Cudahy Packing 
Companies intending to cause a “domino effect” for small, independent packers.11 By 
1941, Rath was the second largest employer in the state, next to John Deere, with nearly 
4,500 workers. The meatpacker primarily focused on pork, but it expanded to beef 
10 UAW Local 838, UAW Local 838: Our History (Des Moines: Allied Printing Trades Council, 
[1980?]), 2-5. 
 
11 Sister John Marie Daly, “History of Unionization in Waterloo, Iowa” (master’s thesis, Creighton 
University, 1962), 54-55. 
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production and added veal and lamb by the 1930s. In 1941, the Waterloo factory built the 
“nation’s largest [modern] single-unit meatpacking facility.” It not only competed with 
national meatpackers, but it also faced local factories in Cedar Rapids, Ottumwa, Sioux 
City, Des Moines, Davenport and Mason City.12  
 The PWOC had its biggest break through with the “Big Four” when it won 
bargaining rights under a master agreement in 1941. This encouraged Rath workers to 
prominently push against the Company’s union, Independent Packinghouse Workers 
Association, and organize under a legitimate union, meaning a union elected by a 
majority of the voters and approved by the NLRB.13 Six months after the NLRB held 
Deere’s bargaining election, Rath workers held their own on November 18, 1942, when 
they overwhelmingly voted for a union.14 They officially organized under the Local 46 of 
the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA). 
 Each union slowly grew in numbers. Their leaders seemed to understand that they 
needed to push for recognition not only by their respective companies, but also by the 
community of Waterloo. So, while they worked to establish their first contact, they also 
tried to build their community presence. At the same time, the political shift in 
Washington D.C. presented a new challenge for organized labor. Organized labor faced a 
time of transition. The Great Depression created an environment of growth and 
12 Rebecca Conard, Bringin’ Home the Bacon: The Rath Packing Company in Waterloo, 1891-
1985, (Iowa City: TruArt Color Graphics, 2010) 4, 7. 
 
13 Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the 
Tragedy of American Labor (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 120.  
 
14 Daly, “History of Unionization in Waterloo, Iowa,” 69-70. 
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collectivism, while WWII led to a period of sacrifice and stability. After ending one war 
and entering into another; the Cold War raised new concerns for labor. 
 
Political Awakening 
In 1947, a Republican-dominated Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act to reign 
in federal oversight of unions in the private sector. President Harry S. Truman vetoed the 
act, but Congress successfully over ruled the executive power and expanded management 
authority over unions. According to Robert W. Cherny, et. al, the Taft-Hartley Act did 
not repeal the Wagner Act, but it did fundamentally change the government’s role in 
labor relations. It established an eighty day “cooling-off” period for strikes considered 
too dangerous to health or safety. It also required union officers to swear they were not 
members of the Communist Party.15  Another major provision of the Taft-Hartley Act is 
Section 14-B. It made “closed shops” illegal, but allowed “union shops.” The closed shop 
required employers to hire only union members, while the union shop stipulated that 
employees who were represented by a union or bargaining agent must be dues-paying, 
union members within a certain time-frame after being hired.16 Without the union shop, 
“free-riders,” employees’ not paying union dues, but who receive union benefits through 
contractual gains, emerged.   
15 Robert W. Cherny, William Issel, and Kieran Walsh Taylor, eds., American Labor and the Cold 
War: Grassroots Politics and Postwar Political Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2004), 2-3. 
 
16 James C. Larew, A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa 1950-1974 (Iowa City: Iowa State 
Historical Department Division of the State Historical Society, 1980), 31.  
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The same year Taft-Hartley Act passed, ten states in the Midwest and the Sunbelt 
region passed “Right to Work” (anti-union shop) legislation. During the 1950s, six more 
states, in these same regions, passed right to work laws.17 Cherny, et al. argues the swift 
passage in these two regions, led by anti-labor coalitions, did not come as a surprise due 
to the “widespread hostility and determined resistance” in the area. The act impacted 
labor unions’ organization efforts in these industrial regions at the very moment unions 
were improving its membership by the end of WWII.18  Iowa was among the initial ten 
states to pass right to work legislation in 1947.  
According to Paul Larew, labor’s lack of statewide organization impeded its 
political action, which was further hampered by Iowa’s weak Democratic Party.19 In the 
early decades of the twentieth-century, U.S. Representative Jonathan P. Dolliver (R-Fort 
Dodge) predicted that “hell would go Methodist before Iowa went Democratic.”20 
Republican dominance in the General Assembly appealed to many interest groups well 
into the 1950s. Two prominent groups, the Iowa Manufactures Association (IMA) and 
the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation (IFBF), held great influence in Iowa politics. Their 
power was maintained by malapportionment that left a growing urban populace to be 
17 U.S. Department of Labor, “Right-to-Work States,” National Council of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx. List of states and 
years RTW legislation passed: 1943: FL; 1947: AZ, AR, GA, IA, NE, NC, ND, SD, TN, VA; 1951: NV; 
1953: AL; 1954: MS, SC; 1955: UT; 1963: WY; 1976: LA; 1985: ID; 1993: TX; 2001: OK; 2012: IN, MI; 
2015: WI.  List of states that passed constitutional amendments: 1944: AR; 1946: AZ, NE, SD; 1948: ND; 
1952: NV; 1958: KS; 1960: MS; 1968: FL; 2001: OK. 
 
18 Cherny, et al., American Labor and the Cold War, 3. 
 
19 Larew, A Party Reborn, 19-20, 31-32. 
 
20 Leland L. Sage, A History of Iowa (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1974), 220. 
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influenced by organized rural and small-town interest.21 This political environment 
played a role in the quick passage of Iowa’s “right to work” law banning the closed shop. 
It first passed the Iowa Senate on March 31, 1947 by a vote of 36-12. Senator John P. 
Berg, from Cedar Falls, representing Black Hawk and Grundy counties, voted for its 
passage. The first section of the bill states: 
It is declared to be the policy of the state of Iowa that no person within its 
boundaries shall be deprived of the right to work at his chosen occupation for any 
employer willing to so employ him, because of membership in, affiliation with, 
withdrawal or expulsion from, or refusal to join any labor union, organization or 
society, and any contract which contravenes this policy is void.22    
  
The news of the Senate’s move to ban closed shops mobilized labor unions across the 
state to take action. The Iowa AFL and CIO organized a “labor holiday” in order “to give 
our members the opportunity to go to Des Moines en masse to appear and meet with our 
state representatives,” as stated in an AFL released statement.23  
 UPWA Local 46 organized a mass meeting during the height of production on 
Saturday, April 19, 1947, in the auditorium of Waterloo East High School. 
Approximately 2,000 members of the reported 4,600 total membership crowded into the 
auditorium to unanimously vote in favor of the labor holiday. Rath Packing Co. was 
virtually shut down due to this meeting, leaving only cleanup crews to prevent any meat 
spoilage.24 Leo Guynn, president of the local, shared the following statement after the 
21 Larew, A Party Reborn, 16-18, 33-34. 
 
22 “Iowa Senate Votes Ban on Closed Shop,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 1, 1947.  
 
23  “Waterloo Workers to Join Holiday,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 20, 1947. 
 
24  “Waterloo Workers to Join Holiday,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 20, 1947. 
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vote to support the holiday, “that the union membership would have the opportunity to 
travel to Des Moines to personally present to the legislature their disapproval of the 
treacherous actions taken against Iowa labor;” he added, “Labor does not intend to absorb 
this abuse without striking back.”25 UAW Local 838, under the leadership of Carl Dahl, 
also voted to participate in the “labor holiday” the following day in the same 
auditorium.26 Dahl recalled mobilization efforts were achieved by word of mouth stating, 
we “passed the word what the Governor’s [Robert Blue] doing to us and said, ‘Be out 
here tomorrow morning at seven o’clock. We’re heading for Des Moines.’ And we 
did.”27 The coalition of Waterloo union members sent an estimated 1,000 member to 
protest in Des Moines on Monday, April 21.  
 A reporter with the Waterloo Daily Courier covered the demonstration. He noted 
“approximately 500 members of [UPWA] in 75 automobiles and four buses” left for Des 
Moines. The UAW-CIO took fifty autos and two buses caring an estimated 350 workers 
from the John Deere Tractor Works. Another 250 members from the Central Labor body 
of the AFL traveled by automobiles, while the Bell Telephone Company took one car.28 
Sending nearly 1,000 members and authorizing other union members to stay home from 
25 “Waterloo Workers to Join Holiday,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 20, 1947. 
 
26 “Thousands Idle in Waterloo as Workers Join Motorcade,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 21, 
1947. 
 
27  Carl Dahl, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 29, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
42. 
 
28 “Thousands Idle in Waterloo as Workers Join Motorcade,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 21, 
1947. 
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work caused majority of the factories in Waterloo to go quiet. Dahl explained, “We shut 
the damn plant down and hauled them all down, hauled busloads down to Des Moines. 
Went to the State Capitol and raised old Blue, Governor Blue.”29   
According to the Courier, the city’s industries were practically shut down. The 
reporter put it, “the John Deere Tractor Co. and the Rath Packing Co. were closed down 
except for the maintenance of ‘essential services’ which would permit prompt resumption 
of fullscale operations Tuesday without loss or spoilage,” he further stated, “Associated 
Manufacturers reported ‘no one working but foreman’ while the Chamberlin Corp. said 
the holiday is ‘quite effective.’”30 Jack Seeber, who started in 1946 as a lathe operator for 
the John Deere Tractor Works, recalled the effectiveness of the “labor holiday” stating, 
“We just told Deere we weren’t coming to work, and I’m telling you, I was down there 
that morning and it was 99 percent effective. Very few people went in that day.”31  
 In Des Moines, state union leaders estimated 60,000 of the 200,000 union 
members in Iowa might convene at the Capitol. But estimates from the event reported the 
crowd at 22,000 participants. Even though it fell well short of the union leaders’ goal, this 
mass crowd “spread over the statehouse lawn, surged into the huge building, jammed the 
basement cafeteria, spilled into corridors and crowded the house chamber, both on the 
29  Dahl, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 29, 1981, ILHOP, Transcript, 42. 
 
30 “Thousands Idle in Waterloo as Workers Join Motorcade,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 21, 
1947. 
 
31  Jack Seeber, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 15, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
18. 
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floor and in the galleries.”32 Some of the state representatives were not pleased with the 
demonstration and made their opinion known in the local papers. Representative Carl 
Burkman (R-Des Moines), chief sponsor of an amendment to further strengthen the 
senate legislation against labor, stated, “This demonstration is definitely one of 
intimidation and this legislature will not be intimidated.”33 He noted that the unions’ 
actions placed the state in a precarious position with their “labor holiday,” which in effect 
meant, “you deal with us or else.”34 
 Governor Blue, standing on a chair positioned between the United State and Iowa 
flags, addressed the labor crowd by mid-morning. He opened his remarks by explaining 
to the demonstrators that “the chief executive of this state as well as the legislature and 
citizens are not unfriendly to the laboring man.” This remark was not received well, and 
boos reverberated from the crowd silencing the Governor. He responded by noting, “You 
have asked me to speak here and I am your guest. If you do not want to listen to me tell 
me.” The crowd obliged and silenced their criticism to allow the Governor to continue his 
statement. The rest of his remarks highlighted the role of the legislature in representing 
all citizens and not the minority of the laborers unionized. “The chief executive of this 
state and the legislature never have been and never will be a rubber stamp for any 
pressure group.” He continued, “They have been elected by the people of this great state 
32  “Thousands Jam State House: Workers Come in Droves for Protest Meet,” Waterloo Daily 
Courier, April 21, 1947. 
 
33  “Plan March on State House: Will Oppose Move to Ban Closed Shop,” Waterloo Daily 
Courier, April 20, 1947. 
 
34  “Open Battle Over Ban on Closed Shop,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 21, 1947. 
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and are legislating as they see fit in the best interests of the greatest number of people of 
this state.”35 
Labor leaders and the mass of demonstrators did not respond well to the 
arguments by Governor Blue and the General Assembly. Dahl recalled the Governor’s 
address stating, “We got told by Governor Blue that we were infinitesimal. That’s the 
very word he used. He said, “As far as I’m concerned, you’re infinitesimal.” In other 
words, that’s just next to nothing.”36 Seeber’s memory was less detailed, but he expressed 
the same sentiment, “[The Governor] politely told us to go to hell, really.”37 The results 
of the demonstration only delayed action on the legislation, but it did not prevent passage. 
The Iowa House passed its version on Tuesday, 74-31, with few labor demonstrators 
present, leaving the House floor and galleries virtually unoccupied.38 Governor Blue 
signed the legislation into law on April 28, 1947, officially making Iowa a “Right to 
Work” state, that “prohibits discrimination against workers because of membership or 
non-membership in a union and bans involuntary check-off of union dues.”39 
A. A. Couch, president of the State Federation of Labor, AFL and John Connolly, 
Jr., a Des Moines labor attorney, tried to challenge the law through the courts, arguing it 
violated the current federal legislation (Wagner Act) due to employers participating in 
35  “Blue Booed in Address to Workers,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 21, 1947. 
 
36  Dahl, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 29, 1981, ILHOP, Transcript, 43. 
 
37  Seeber, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 15, 1981, ILHOP, Transcript, 19. 
 
38 “House Passes Ban on Closed Shops; 74-31,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 23, 1947.; “House 
Votes Down State Ban on Closed Shop Only,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 22, 1947. 
 
39  “Blue Signs Bill to Outlaw Closed Shop,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 28, 1947. 
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interstate commerce, an action regulated by federal law. Connolly argued, “Where the 
federal government has assumed jurisdiction of subject matter, a state cannot make laws 
contradictory thereto,” he continued, “The government has assumed such jurisdiction. 
The provision of the Iowa bill are proper objectives of collective bargaining and courts 
have so held for years.”40 Their argument may have been within grounds, but action by 
the federal government passing the Taft-Hartley Act made their case moot. Legal 
remedies could not overturn the actions taken by the Iowa General Assembly or 
Governor Blue. Earl Riley, who worked in the foundry as a shake-out man at the John 
Deere Tractor Works, recalled the struggle for labor representation in the legislature 
stating, “Oh, well, we was down to Des Moines and had a bunch of people down there to 
try to fight against [right to work law]. But the people that we had in office then, it was 
pretty hard to do anything with, I’ll tell you that.”41 The unions were left with a last 
resort: only political activism could overturn the law. 
At the start of 1948, the Courier Editorial staff argued Governor Blue would hold 
a strong advantage in the Republican primary due to his incumbent status and the lack of 
Republican principles shared by his challengers, of course “barring [any] unforeseen 
developments.” At the same time, the editors noted the political enemies Governor Blue 
made during his previous two terms, notably organized labor. They stated, “There is 
reportedly a movement by some organized labor groups to register as Republicans in 
40 “Court Battle Promised on Union Curbs,” Waterloo Daily Courier, April 24, 1947. 
 
41 Earl Riley, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 22, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
21. 
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order to vote at the GOP primary. This may stimulate a larger-than-average turnout at the 
primary.”42  
The candidate that inspired such a movement was Republican William S. 
Beardsley. A state representative from New Virginia, Beardsley served in the senate from 
1932-1940. He was a supporter of labor and an opponent of the right to work law.43 
Organized labor, along with special interest groups, such as the IFBF and Iowa State 
Education Association (ISEA), influenced their members to participate in the Republican 
primary. Both the IFBF and ISEA did not officially endorse a candidate for governor 
during the primaries, but the Farm Bureau leaders believed “that the bigger the vote in the 
Republican primary the better the chance for Beardsley,” as reported by the Iowa Daily 
Press Writer in the Courier. The same sentiment was shared by the educators, by getting 
the vote out their members “will mostly cast their ballots for Beardsley”.44 
The campaign to switch party allegiance was not welcomed by all Waterloo rank-
and-file union members. Gus Morkel, a member of the AFL Machinists at Chamberlain’s 
Manufacturing, did not favor the CIO unions’ advocating who to vote for stating, “I’m 
going to vote the way I want to vote, and it’s none of your business, and the way you 
want to vote is none of my business.”45 The editors at the Courier did their part to 
42 Editorial, “Blue to Run Again,” Waterloo Daily Courier, January 22, 1948. 
 
43 “Beardsley to Start Race for Governor,” Waterloo Daily Courier, January 3, 1948. 
 
44 Iowa Daily Press Writer, “Farm Bureau is Reported Pushing Beardsley Drive,” Waterloo Daily 
Courier, February 12, 1948. 
 
45 Gus Morkel, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 26, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
37. 
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discourage switching party affiliation citing State Code in their editorial, “Changing Party 
Allegiance”:  
‘It shall be unlawful for any person…not at the time a member in good faith of 
such political party, to vote at such primary election.’ Anyone found guilty of 
violating this section of the code or aiding anyone else in violating it ‘shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not to exceed 
$100 or be imprisoned in the country jail not to exceed 30 days.’46  
 
In order for a voter to be convicted, the accuser needed to produce sufficient evidence 
that proved the voter’s insincerity in switching party affiliation. This was a major flaw in 
the code that made it ineffective. However, it did not stop the editors from offering one 
last plea, “it would be unwise for anyone who has been and will in the future be active in 
Democratic politics to participate in this movement in the Republican primary.”47   
The editorial did not deter the UAW Local 838 who expanded their efforts and 
targeted other races down ballot, including Representative John W. Gwynne (R-
Waterloo) who had voted in favor of the Taft-Hartley Act. Dahl recognized the 
limitations of Iowa’s political landscape and the slim odds a Democrat could win an open 
seat, let alone defeat an incumbent Republican. He decided to fight fire with fire, 
recalling “We just went after [Governor Blue] and supported [Beardsley] because we 
couldn’t beat him with a Democrat. So we supported a Republican and beat him with 
another Republican.”48 Between statehood in 1846 to 1948, Iowans elected six governors 
46 Editorial, “Changing Party Allegiance,” Waterloo Daily Courier, May 20, 1948. 
 
47 Editorial, “Changing Party Allegiance,” Waterloo Daily Courier, May 20, 1948. 
 
48 Dahl, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 29, 1981, ILHOP, Transcript, 43. 
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outside the Republican Party - five of them were Democrats and one a Whig.49 
Supporting a Republican seemed the only viable option for organized labor this election 
cycle.  
The June third primary revealed a significant increase in voter participation under 
the Republican ticket. Blue won his first gubernatorial primary by less than 30,000 votes 
in a three-way race in 1944 and then defeated his challenger by over 60,000 votes in 
1946.50 His re-election for a third term ended in defeat to Beardsley, by losing over 
62,000 votes in the 1948 primary.51 Republican turnout in the 1944 primary was 175,116. 
In 1946, turnout increased by nearly twenty-seven percent, with 221,614 Republican 
voters coming to the polls. And, in 1948, turnout reached 317,709 Republican voters, an 
increase of over forty-three percent statewide.  
Black Hawk County, where nearly sixty-five percent of the population resided in 
the county seat of Waterloo, also showed an increase in voter turnout.52 In 1944, 3,998 
voters participated in the Republican gubernatorial primary, in which Blue finished 
second. In 1946, 4,851 voters showed up at the polls and Blue won the county by nearly 
1,100 votes. And, in 1948, 10,558 votes were casted in Black Hawk County, an increase 
of 118 percent from the previous primary. Blue lost to Beardsley by 1,722 votes. Ninety-
49  Tom W. Purcell, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1949-1950, no. 43, 53d General Assembly, 
(Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1949), 253. 
 
50  Lou Gardner, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1945-1946, no. 41, 51st General Assembly, 
(Des Moines: State of Iowa, [1945?]), 264.; Robert A. Jarnagin, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1947-
1948, no. 42, 52d General Assembly, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1947), 282. 
 
51 Purcell, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1949-1950, 284. 
 
52 Gardner, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1945-1946, 179. 
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two percent of all voters in the 1948 gubernatorial primary voted Republican, reflecting a 
four percent increase from 1944 and two percent increase in 1946.53 
The targeted Congressional primary between U.S. Representative Gwynne and H. 
R. Gross (R-Waterloo) closely mirrored the result in the gubernatorial primary. With only 
a two percent voter drop off, Gross won Black Hawk Co. by over 2,000 votes (6,205 to 
Gwynne’s 4,164) and won the Third Congressional District Republican nomination by 
over 4,700 votes. In the general election, both Beardsley and Gross went on to easily 
defeat their Democrat challengers. Black Hawk County re-elected the two Republicans 
for the Iowa House.54  
The Local 838 membership was determined to defeat Governor Blue and 
Representative Gwynne. Some even volunteered for their challengers’ campaigns. Riley 
noted, “That’s the only Republican I ever voted for in my life,” but “I was one that drove 
my car and went all over the [state], along with a lot of others, and campaigned for this 
guy in little towns, put out handbills and everything for [Gross].”55 Riley even helped pay 
for the newly elected Congressman’s gas to get to the Nation’s Capital,  
Some of us fellows went out—Bob Williams and Dwight Freedley and some 
more of us good union guys—went out there and [Gross] didn’t have money 
enough to drive his old Plymouth to Washington, D.C., so we proceeded to get in 
our pockets when we was pretty hard up about that time too, and kicked in a few 
dollars to buy him gas to get to Washington, D.C.56 
53 Gardner, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1945-1946, 263., Jarnagin, ed., State of Iowa 
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Seeber also recognized the motives of Dahl in raising voter participation in the 1948 
primary stating, “I can remember President Dahl urging us all to switch our allegiance 
into the Republican primary, which I did, and voted for Gross…There was an old 
conservative [Representative Gwynne] been in for a number of years, and we couldn’t 
elect a Democrat, so we thought Mr. Gross was the answer to our problems at the 
time.”57   
 That assumption did not prove fruitful for organized labor in two ways. First, 
Gross was a Republican who consistently voted with the Republican bloc in Congress. It 
created an impasse with labors’ efforts to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act. Secondly, it could 
be difficult to convince the labor membership to re-register as Democrats after the 
election. Dahl recalled, “We couldn’t get them back to the Democrats again! That’s the 
hell of it with that…We switch them in the primary, and we never got them back as 
Democrats.”58 The absence of a strong Democratic Party left Iowa one-sided in a two-
party system. According to Larew, the growth of special interest groups, such as the Farm 
Bureau and Iowa Manufactures, “were visibly thwarting the popular will of Iowa’s 
citizens.”59 These interest groups, along with the rural, conservative controlled 
legislature, faced issues that would hinder their constituents and their majority. The key 
57 Seeber, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 15, 1981, ILHOP, Transcript, 17-18. 
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issues for debate were “liquor-by-the-drink”, tax reform, labor laws, and legislative 
reapportionment.60  
The 1947 right to work law and the 1948 election caused a political awakening, 
not only for Waterloo locals but for unions across Iowa and the country. Union members 
realized they needed political influence at the city and state level that favored labor. Over 
next two decades, Waterloo unions pushed for a shared labor agenda focused on 
supporting candidates who would positively improve labor’s position in the state. Their 
primary goal would be to elect enough supporters to repeal the right to work law. 
 
1950-1964: Battle for Representation 
The 1948 primary and general election were not the only focus of labor in 
Waterloo. Wartime inflation caused a wage-price imbalance that affected many industries 
across the country. Packinghouse workers, under AFL and CIO unions, pressured their 
respective leaders to negotiate a twenty-nine-cent-per-hour increase industry wide after 
receiving a sixteen-cent-per-hour increase in 1946. According to Bruce Fehn, wages were 
not the sole issue for concern. Union leaders sought the opportunity to show their 
strength in spite of the newly enacted Taft-Harley Act, which severely limited their 
traditional strike tactics of walkouts and shutdowns.  
While UPWA leaders were negotiating their terms, the rejuvenated Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen (AMCBW) of the AFL announced they reached a 
settlement of a wage increase that was lower than the twenty-nine-cent-per-hour increase. 
60 Larew, A Party Reborn, 30. 
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At the beginning of March 1948, negations reached an impasse. The UPWA persisted on 
a twenty-nine-cents increase, but the Big Four (Armour, Cudahy, Swift, and Wilson) 
countered with a nine-cent increase. This was the last straw for UPWA membership. 
They voted to strike, not a single plant, but industrywide by a margin of twenty to one.61 
The strike began at Rath Packing Company on March 16, sending 4,600 union workers to 
the picket line, a small fraction of the nearly 100,000 UPWA striking across 140 plants in 
twenty states.62  
Six weeks later the strike in Waterloo became a riot. The cause was the shooting 
of Chuck Farrell, Local 46 union founder, by strike breaker Fred Lee Roberts. Soon the 
riot became a war zone. The City of Waterloo requested the Iowa National Guard to 
come in and restore order at the plant, and Governor Blue immediately responded. Two 
hundred of the estimated eight hundred guardsmen lined up shoulder-to-shoulder, 
stretching almost two blocks long, in front of the Rath Plant and “on command the troops 
fixed bayonets and advanced across the street, pushing back the strikers that were still 
parading in front of the plant.”63 The Guard erected a perimeter around the plant and 
patrolled the area in jeeps and trucks, while two to three soldiers maintained guard at 
every block.  
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The strike ended on May 28 with the rank-and-file agreeing on Rath’s original 
proposal, mirroring the Big 4, of a nine-cent increase in pay and resumed full operations 
on June 1. The effects of the 1948 strike ran deep, “a man’s life lost, a woman injured, 
families divided, finances lost, and hearts embittered.” 64 The Courier echoed a national 
sentiment toward rioting and violence in the United States:  
Nobody gains by violence and no policy in an industrial dispute which involves 
violence is going to be tolerated by the American people. The only people who, 
after quiet thought, advocate violence are the Communists who like to see people 
killed and hatred stimulated to divide a community.65  
 
The presence, or suggestion, of Communists involvement in the 1948 strike led UPWA 
Local 46 to lose membership and exposed itself to be challenged by the independent 
National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers for bargaining agent. This challenge did 
not measure up to a significant take over, but the four to one majority in favor of the CIO 
union showed some sense of collectiveness among the remaining members.66  
Rath Packing Company and UPWA Local 46 were not the only workers fighting 
for better wages. UAW Local 838 entered their own grievances with the John Deere 
Tractor Works in 1949, seeking higher wages, improved medical benefits, right to strike, 
and other contractual improvements.67 In the summer of 1950, employees at the Waterloo 
Deere plant entered, what would be the second longest strike in the state of Iowa, after 
64 Daly, “History of Unionization in Waterloo, Iowa,” 104-105. 
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core makers in the Foundry started a wildcat strike over piecework pricing. It lasted for 
nearly four months with more than 13,500 workers out of work companywide in Iowa 
and Illinois.68 The strike ended in December with a new five-year contract that improved 
the union’s situation, but it fell short of achieving all of its goals.69  The long term 
agreement provided stability in the plant, but left open possibilities of the contract being 
misused by the company or workers, which could not be resolved until the next contract. 
Without yearly negotiations, union members decreased their participation in local 
activities. Gene Condon, who succeeded Carl Dahl as president of Local 838 in 1956, 
recalled the decline in participation stating, “Well, shortly after the 1950 strike we had 
large attendance, but then it would dwindle off about 1953. It’d get down to the point 
where it was hard to get a quorum of 35 people.”70 The success in gaining a strong 
contract also affected membership participation. Union leaders looked to political activity 
as one way to renew interest. 
Organized labor in Waterloo formed the Waterloo Coordinating Council 
following the 1950 strike. This voluntary group included representatives of both craft and 
industrial unions, which organized to implement the collective electoral goal to “try and 
elect public officials who would as least give us a chance to survive.”71 The council 
68“Big Tractor Plant Idled by Decision,” Waterloo Daily Courier, September 3, 1950. 
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targeted the March 1950 mayoral race to unseat Mayor Bailey Barnes by supporting 
Lawrence “Pat” Touchae. Joseph McGlade, state commander of the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, was labor’s initial candidate to run for Waterloo mayor. However, he withdrew 
from the race leaving on a few days for Touschae to get his name on the ballot.72 Labor 
rallied together by sending people to the downtown area and business district of 
Waterloo. Within forty-eight hours, they collected enough signatures to put Touschae on 
the ticket before the noon deadline on that Friday.73 UAW Local 838’s union member, 
Clarence Lines, ran for Third ward councilman under Touschae’s ticket. On election 
night, Touschae won by a slim margin of 129 votes over Mayor Barnes. His ticket won 
four of six council seats, including Lines, in the highest turnout for a city election up to 
that time, with 14,505 votes cast.74  
 The Waterloo Coordinating Council proved its collective effort could produce 
electoral victories. The political function of the union strengthened as it elected its first 
local candidates openly supportive of the local unions and organized labor.75 However, 
these small gains locally were not enough to make a dent statewide in the Republican 
controlled legislature. The Iowa Democratic Party was inactive up to 1950. It had little 
influence statewide that left local areas to organize themselves. AFL and CIO unions 
needed to challenge the Iowa Farm Bureau’s and IMA’s influence over Republican 
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legislators. Even though both the AFL and CIO championed strong membership rolls 
statewide, their differing ideals in political action impeded initial success across Iowa. 
The AFL focused on local activism, while the CIO, led by the UAW, sought political 
power up and down the ballot with the purpose to strengthen labor laws.76  
In the 1950s, the presence of the Communist Party and the Cold War severely 
impacted the growth of labor, especially in the CIO. According to Ellen Schrecker, 
professor of history, the internal purging of left-led unions made the CIO and AFL weak 
and vulnerable to further anti-labor legislation. It also prevented the national unions from 
effectively growing their membership and organizing the unorganized, while 
implementing internal reforms over their previous focus on social reforms.77 In order for 
the two main international unions to preserve any political strength during the era of 
McCarthyism, new leadership decided to merge the two organizations in 1955. Led by 
George Meany (President of AFL) and Walter Reuther (President of CIO), the United 
Labor Policy committee unanimously agreed “to create a single trade union center in 
America through the process of merger [which] will preserve the integrity of each 
affiliated national and international union.” The AFL ratified the merger in the first week 
of December 1955, and the CIO followed suit with only a few dissentions.78  
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The weakening of the international unions left the locals to become more 
prominent leaders in labor. The merger required collaboration among locals to work 
together and maintain strong, active membership. This was not a new concept to 
Waterloo because the rise of political activism after the right to work law in 1947 had 
already led to collaboration in the following state and local elections. Condon recalled, 
“We were the first county to merge of any county in the United States. We had what we 
called a coordinating council with the AFL-CIO and all unions, and we merged officially 
February 6, 1956. It was just a continuation of our old organization.”79 The newly unified 
labor organization, Black Hawk County Union Council (BHUC, county was later 
dropped from the name), emerged from the consolidation of the Waterloo Central Labor 
Body (AFL) and the Black Hawk Industrial Union Council (CIO).  It was led by John 
Cooney (UAW) and Paul Larsen (Pipefitters).80 
Larsen, executive secretary, recalled there were initial hesitations from a few 
locals over the merger. However, the BHUC overcame the opposition and members 
“were able to, in most cases, reach agreements so there [would] be only one of the two 
groups [AFL or CIO] on the ballot, giving us more of a chance to win the election, which 
at that time we were having quite good success.”81 Throughout the 1950s, the local 
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unions continued to encourage and nominate city and state candidates who supported and 
were favorable to labor. BHUC’s presence in Waterloo served as more than a labor 
council. It even took over the local Democratic Party. According to Cooney, “We got our 
membership very, very active in politics…Well, as far as I’m concerned, the Black Hawk 
County Union Council was the local Democratic Party.”82 The limitations of Iowa’s 
Democratic Party were not isolated to Waterloo, but throughout the entire state. James 
Larew argues that Iowa’s Democratic Party was dormant between 1938 and 1962 due to 
three factors: urban areas lack of proportional elective representation; limited 
organizational techniques, especially in the larger cities; and the patronage system to 
sustain the party expenses and loyalties built by party chairman, Jake Moore.83 
Larsen’s recollection mirrored Larew’s assessment as he noted in 1981: 
It was very poorly organized. Well, at that time Black Hawk County was very 
similar to many other places. [Democrats] were just so used to being number two, 
not winning, but they would get these purely patronage things. [The chairman] 
didn’t really develop any party structure as such very much. And again, a lot of 
the help for this came from the labor movement in these campaigns.84   
 
The lack of party activism was not solely on the shoulders of the state and county 
leadership. Larsen also suggested labor’s efforts in the 1948 election hindered its 
effectiveness: “What happened there was that for a long time thereafter many people that 
were leaders in the labor movement were registered as Republicans, and their 
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membership identified a little bit that way. So we were unable to be an effective voice 
until the late fifties, and then it started to change.”85  
One new element to emerge in the late fifties was the Committee on Political 
Education (COPE) that replaced the UAW-CIO Political Action Committee (PAC) after 
the merger. COPE, through the BHUC, became active in elections by endorsing 
candidates who supported labor-friendly legislation and policies. Member contributions 
helped financed its political campaigns. Larsen recognized the Democratic struggle, but 
with the development of COPE, and the presence of BHUC, Waterloo and the Third 
Congressional District received its necessary spark. He stated, “In the State Legislature 
the first friends that we had since the Depression years was after the Council became 
active politically. We had a very, very active Third District COPE. And as a result of that, 
we were able to gain a great deal of influence that we had not [previously] had with 
members of the State Legislature from rural areas.”86 Despite the growing pressures 
driven by anti-communism accusations against organized labor, Waterloo continued to 
improve its political activism. It looked to expand its representation outside of city 
government and into the statehouse.  
Iowa’s population, by the turn of the twentieth century, shifted away from rural to 
urban areas. The 1960 census recorded another decade of increased population in Black 
Hawk County and in Waterloo. The county’s population increased by 23 percent over 
1950’s census and by 53.2 of 1940. Specifically in Waterloo, the city’s population grew 
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by 11.5 percent since 1950 and 38.7 percent from 1940. Overall, Iowa’s urban population 
- making up 53 percent of the state’s total population - increased by 16.9 percent in 1960, 
while rural areas declined by 5.5 percent.87 The growing demands for action from the 
legislature to address urban concerns, mainly reapportionment, created a strong platform 
for labor. The regained strength of the Democratic leadership at the state level, along with 
a united urban coalition and the Federation of Labor, combined to challenge the state’s 
rural, Republican dominance, influenced by IFBF and IMA.  
 Waterloo unions maintained labor support in the city government when voters re-
elected Mayor Touchae to his fourth term in November 1955. Touchae then resigned in 
the middle of his term to become the executive secretary of the Chamber of Commerce.88 
The election of 1956 hinted at a decline of Republican dominance in the state, 
particularly when Herschel Loveless (D-Ottumwa) defeated first-year incumbent Leo 
Hoegh. Loveless became the sixth Democrat Governor of Iowa, the first in twenty years. 
It would not be easy. He faced a Republican controlled legislature and a Republican 
Lieutenant Governor William H. Nicolas (R-Mason City). This was Iowa’s first split-
party executive branch since 1890.89 In Black Hawk County, Republicans maintained 
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control of its county officials, but lost the majority on the board of supervisors.90 County 
Republicans also withheld a challenge from Dahl and another Democrat for the two state 
house seats.91 The editors at the Courier wrote a warning to Republicans in Iowa: “This 
has become a two-party state and no Republican can any longer be assured of victory 
simple because he is a Republican.”92 
After Touchae’s resignation, labor leaders needed to find another mayoral 
candidate who would support labor and be at least nonpartisan, if not favoring labor, 
during contract negotiations. In the 1957 mayoral election, BHUC supported Edward A. 
Jochumsen, who won the election and served for four terms. Black Hawk County 
Democrats finally broke through in 1958, electing two of the three state representatives 
on the ballot. They elected Melvin Wolf (D-Waterloo) to the state senate and Robert D. 
Fulton (D-Waterloo) to the house. The other Democrat candidate lost the second house 
seat by thirteen votes.93 In 1959, the voters in the Second Ward elected Gene Condon to 
the city council, who served two terms on Jochemsen’s “People’s Ticket.”94  
90 “Demos Win Control of Supervisors,” Waterloo Daily Courier, November 7, 1956.; Offical 
Register 1957-1958 pg 310 
 
91 Sherman W. Needham, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1957-1958, no. 47, 57th General 
Assembly, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, [1957?]), 358. 
 
92 Editorial, “Personal Victory for President Poses Problems for Republicans,” Waterloo Daily 
Courier, November 7, 1956. 
 
93 Leon S. Barnes, ed., State of Iowa Official Register 1959-1960, no. 48, 58th General Assembly, 
(Des Moines: State of Iowa, [1959?]), 377. 
 
94 “Jochumsen’s Ticket in Smashing Triumph: Many New Faces Due at City Hall,” Waterloo 
Daily Courier, November 6, 1957.; “Landslide Winner Jochumsen Moving: Peoples Ticket Swept into 
New City Hall,” Waterloo Daily Courier, November 4, 1959. 
 
                                                          
46 
Outside of Black Hawk County, Governor Loveless faced tough opposition from 
the rural, Republican controlled legislature due to the state’s inability to reapportion its 
districts to recognize urban population centers. Labor, through the Democratic Party, 
moved its positions closely to the top of the legislative agenda, but it could not achieve its 
ultimate goal of overturning Iowa’s right to work law without majority support at all 
three levels. Legislators debated reapportionment in the 1955, 1957, and 1959 sessions, 
but it resulted in each chamber blocking the other’s proposals. Charles Wiggins describes 
the tenuous debates as “legislative checkmate” where “the urban forces tended to rely 
upon much senate opposition to the rural forces’ plan, whiles the rural forces were 
bolstered by opposition on the part of many representatives to the proposals advanced by 
the urban interests.”95 
The Des Moines Register noted in 1956 that: “Residents of Iowa’s small towns 
and rural counties, who have long since died or moved away, carry more weight in the 
legislature than the swelling populations of the growing industrial cities. Legislators who 
represent more ghosts than men are elected on the same ticket with unnecessary county 
elective officials.”96 With the increased union membership and the growth of urban areas 
that favored the Democratic Party, reapportionment moved to the forefront of the party’s 
platform. Democrats, urban residents, and unions challenged the fact that “one-fourth of 
95 Charles W. Wiggins, “The Post World War II Legislative Reapportionment Battle in Iowa 
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the state’s citizens (most of them rural) elected a majority of the House, and about one-
third of the voters elected a majority of the Senate.”97 
Iowa’s censuses had recorded an increase in the urban population for each 
subsequent decade since 1900. But Iowa’s General Assembly, largely dominated by rural 
interests, turned a blind eye to reapportionment. To maintain the rural, conservative 
majority, the Iowa legislature had not redrawn the map to reflect population growth since 
1886. This was constitutional due to two amendments that limited state action. The 1904 
amendment regulated the Iowa House to 108 seats that equated “one representative from 
each county, except for the nine most populous counties which were granted two 
representatives.” And the 1928 amendment created a 50 member Senate by limiting each 
county to no more than one senator, regardless of population.98  
The 1960 Election temporarily stopped the Democrats momentum. Black Hawk 
County Republicans regained control of the board of supervisors and sent the two 
Republican candidates back to the Iowa house. They defeated Fulton’s re-election and 
held off Larsen’s challenge for those house seats. The only Democrat to hold his seat was 
State Senator Wolf, who was not up for re-election. The county supported Nixon’s ticket 
for President and the relatively unknown Jack Miller (R-Sioux City) for U.S. Senator 
over Governor Loveless. The majority of the voters in Black Hawk supported Lieutenant 
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Governor Edward M. McManus (D-Keokuk) for the vacated governorship, but McManus 
lost to Norman A. Erbe (R-Boone) statewide.99  
According to state constitutional guidelines, each election ending in a zero (i.e. 
1940, 1950, 1960…) would include a ballot measure asking voters if they would support 
a Constitutional Convention. Labor, urban areas, and predominately Democrats saw this 
as their only plausible way to achieve reapportionment. The ad hoc group, Citizens 
Committee for a Constitutional Convention, formed to advocate for the passage of the 
measure. The committee was supported by Iowa’s liberal groups, including the League of 
Women Voters and the Iowa’s Federation of Labor. Rural and conservative forces 
responded with their own ad hoc group, Iowans for Reapportionment by Legislative 
Action. It was supported heavily by IFBF and IMA with the goal to prevent any further 
changes to the State’s Constitution that could arise during a convention including, 
overturning Iowa’s right to work law and other measures against unions.100 Black Hawk 
County strongly supported the measure (35,807 to 12,792), but the rural county voters 
overwhelmingly prevented its passage 534,628 to 470,257.101 With the defeat of the 
constitutional convention measure, Republicans took action to maintain their regained 
majority. They pushed through their reapportionment amendment known as the Shaff 
Plan. 
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 The plan, originally drafted by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation in 1955, was 
sponsored by Senator David Shaff (R-Clinton). It called for “the apportioning of the 
senate on a population basis and the house on an area basis, with one representative from 
each county.”102 It passed the 1961 session by one vote casted by Senator Adolph Elvers 
of Elkader. He was the sole Democrat to support the plan after party leadership urged for 
unanimous support against it. The Democrat leadership in turn called it the “Shaft 
Plan.”103 The 1963 session followed similar lines for passage, but it saw an increase in 
assenting votes from urban Republicans who joined their rural colleagues under the 
notion that it was the best plan to achieve reapportionment at the time. Meeting the 
State’s constitutional requirements for an amendment, the Shaff Plan was sent to the 
voters for their approval at a special election on December 3, 1963.104 
Waterloo unions, Chamber of Commerce, and city leaders set aside its partisan 
differences and joined together in the debate solely between rural and urban voters. The 
Waterloo Junior Chamber of Commerce hosted a debate in August 1963 between Senator 
Shaff and Pat Touchae, executive vice president of the Waterloo Chamber of Commerce 
and former mayor, on the pros and cons of the amendment. Senator Shaff argued that his 
plan offered the fairest make-up for the state, because “if you place apportionment on 
population, 17 counties would control each House…They would outvote the other 82 
counties.” Touchae countered his argument by suggesting, “Why should the farmer, 
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because he’s using a large area, be entitled to veto power over the majority?” The former 
mayor further denied the argument that voting down the Shaff Plan would cause the 
statehouse to be run by a majority influenced by a union-backed political machine. He 
emphasized that most town and city residents grew up on the farm and offered this 
rhetorical question to the audience, “Has their move from the rural to the urban areas 
caused them to be less desirable of enjoying rights and privileges of the first class 
citizenship?”105 
Touchae’s impassioned statements against the Shaff Plan emphasized urban 
centers’ willingness to prevent the severe impact of its passage on their representational 
rights. Newly elected Governor Harold Hughes (D-Ida Grove) joined the fight against the 
Shaff Plan, independent of any ad hoc group, noting the “Iowa legislature was on the 
right road in seeking legislative reapportionment, but wound up heading the “wrong 
direction.’” He further expressed the Shaff Plan “would pit an urban Senate against a 
rural House in a situation that will lead to deadlock and to the rural-urban antagonisms 
that will retard the development of Iowa.”106  
Supporters of the Shaff Plan went beyond their campaign from reapportionment 
to expressing concerns of a union takeover in the statehouse, if the amendment failed. 
The Governor publicly addressed one accusation from the group “Physicians Committee 
for Reapportionment,” which included seventeen members of the Iowa State Medical 
Society. The committee sent a letter to the society’s membership asking, “Shall organized 
105 “Pros, Cons of Shaff Plan Aired at Jaycee Meeting,” Waterloo Daily Courier, August 29, 1963. 
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labor control the future lives and destiny of the citizens of Iowa?” They expanded their 
argument stating: 
 
Now what can we do? All we can really hope to accomplish is to educate the 
electorate and combat the propaganda of the big unions. We can ally ourselves 
with other organizations in a last ditch fight for freedom…We can literally join 
hands with our friends.107 
 
Governor Hughes passionately issued the following response, “I don’t know how 
responsible people can attempt to sow the seeds of fear among Iowa people - fear of one 
man against another.” He continued, using the same rationale Touchae expressed in 
Waterloo, “The people of Iowa should realize that 90 percent of laboring people in the 
state have had some contact with the farm, and many of them are only a generation away 
from the farm itself.”108 The Governor even highlighted labor’s shortfall in achieving 
elected office in city halls or the legislature. This point was echoed by Duane Dewel, 
chairman of “Iowans Against the Shaff Plan” from Algona and supported by Charles L. 
Davis, president of the IFL, AFL-CIO. Dewel argued: 
It’s ridiculous to claim that 70,000 labor union members in this state are going to 
push around Iowa’s 2,757,000 citizens. The labor union members are 
concentrated in a few cities, while Iowa Farm Bureau members are spread out 
through many counties in such a fashion that they can push the state around and 
run it.109 
 
107 “Hughes Deplores Doctors’ Letter for Shaff Plan,” Waterloo Daily Courier, October 17, 1963. 
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Even the conservative leaning Courier editorial staff challenged the claims of a 
labor takeover in an editorial entitled, “Shaff Plan Backers Try to Create Fear, Say City 
People Can’t Be Trusted.” They argued that voting against the plan would not mean 
defeat for conservative principles, nor would the plan create a permanent rural minority. 
They claimed that the state’s seventeen largest counties, which contained nearly fifty 
percent of Iowa’s population, were represented by “25 Republican state legislators and 
only 18 Democratic.” And the editorial claimed “only one of these Democratic legislators 
is a labor union official.” The editors also argued labor had connections to the farm that 
benefited both from their presence in the state. The editorial concluded:  
Farmers in Iowa will have a sympathetic audience among city people in 
presenting their case. Farmers should not vote out of fear but from a 
determination to promote a progressive Iowa which will provide jobs for the 
young people coming off the farms… After all, what good is a “right to work” 
law unless the majority of Iowa citizens believe that employees should have the 
legally protected right not to join a union?110 
 
  Over 462,000 votes were casted in the special election. The Shaff Plan was 
defeated by margins of three to two statewide and with even higher margins in Iowa’s 
most populous seventeen counties. Black Hawk County defeated the plan by a margin of 
five to one, with a nearly thirty-five percent voter turnout. In Waterloo, the measure lost 
by a ten to one margin, with 10,198 against and 1,167 in favor. Even the county’s rural 
110 Editorial, “Shaff Plan Backers Try to Create Fear, Say City People Can’t Be Trusted,” 
Waterloo Daily Courier, December 2, 1962. 
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precincts opposed the measure nearly two to one over those who supported it.111 Condon 




In fact, the greatest thing that happened outside of our contracts and everything 
was when we defeated the Shaff Plan, reapportionment plan, on December 3, 
[1963], and we finally got representation in the House of Representatives and in 
the Senate. Labor’s role in getting reapportionment and establishing a two-party 
system for the first time in I don’t know how many years, that was the biggest 
contribution that I could’ve possibly made and that I’m very proud of.112    
 
Labor’s involvement, along with the League of Women Voters and united urban voters, 
both Republicans and Democrats, defeated the Shaff Plan. But the plan’s failure still did 
not solve the reapportionment issue. This would eventually be settled through the Iowa 
and U.S. Supreme Courts over challenges lasting nine years. The Iowa Supreme Court 
redrew the state’s legislative apportionment map after its Noun v. Turner (1972) decision. 
The result, according to one analysis, created the “most equitably apportioned legislature 
in the Union!”113 
 Defeating the Shaff Plan gave union leaders’ confidence that their voices could be 
heard in the legislature. That confidence grew after Iowa joined President Johnson’s 
111 “Black Hawk Turns Down Plan 5 to 1, Only Three Townships Back Shaff,” Waterloo Daily 
Courier, December 4, 1963.; “Shaff Plan Killed, Iowa Rejects Proposal 3-2,” Waterloo Daily Courier, 
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landslide election of 1964. Democrats overwhelmingly were elected to national and state 
offices up and down the ballot.114 Iowans woke up on the morning of November 4, 1964 
reading headlines in Iowa’s leading newspapers that descriptively summed up the 
elections results. The Des Moines Register led with “The Johnson Victory Landslide for 
Hughes; Democrats Win Statehouse” and “Worst Loss for G.O.P. in Iowa History.” The 
Cedar Rapids Gazette printed, “Demos Win Greatest Triumph in Iowa History,” while 
Dubuque’s Telegraph-Herald was more subtle and straightforward: “Hughes Victory 
Margin 7-3 Iowa House, State Offices Go Demo.” The Waterloo Daily Courier’s front 
page was covered in headlines “Iowa Demos Score Biggest Vote Victory, Hughes Leads 
Massive Triumph; Party Wins Statehouse and House Majority,” “Historic County 
Victory, Demos Win First Courthouse Posts in Black Hawk,” and “Gross Is Only Iowa 
Republican Solon, Bucks Tide by Narrow Victory.” 
The Democrats also swept the state representation in Black Hawk County. 
Condon, who won by over 4,800 votes, became the first labor leader to serve in the state 
senate. He was joined by five other Democrats in the House, four of whom were from 
Waterloo. Another historical triumph came when James Jackson won his House race. He 
was the first African American elected to serve Black Hawk County in the state 
legislature. Representative Jackson joined Mrs. Willie Stevenson Glanton, from Des 
Moines, in becoming the first two African Americans to be seated in the Iowa House of 
Representatives.115 Democrat victories continued down through county officials, where it 
114 Larew, A Party Reborn, 92. 
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held major offices in the Courthouse for the first time in its history including: Auditor, 
Clerk of Court, and County Attorney. Republicans retained County Sheriff, whom was 
unopposed in the primary and general election. Finally, Democrats regained control of 
the board of supervisors with a super majority of four to one.116  
 The sweeping majority caught even Democrats and labor leaders off guard. 
Seeber recalled, “All of a sudden, here we were with all kinds of county candidates that 
didn’t know what they were going to do. You know, we ran the usual people, and all of a 
sudden they won.”117 The Courier editors softened the Republican defeat locally by 
noting the dwindling electoral margins county officials and state legislatures had faced in 
the previous elections and the shortcomings of Barry Goldwater’s Presidential ticket 
concluding, “When the party’s presidential candidate can carry only 11 precincts - and 
those by small margins - the local candidates have no chance.” They continued, “The 
local Democratic organization apparently did not anticipate the great Democratic sweep 
this year, since it did not bring out a candidate in opposition to Sherriff Elmer 
Hightower... even he probably would have been defeated had a Democratic opponent 
been named.”118 
  In the statewide races, Governor Hughes was re-elected by a resounding margin, 
winning 97 of Iowa’s 99 counties. The Democrat Ticket also claimed victory in the 
116 “Historic County Victory, Demos Win First Courthouse Posts in Black Hawk,” Waterloo Daily 
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Lieutenant Governor race, by electing Senator Fulton (D-Waterloo), who’s vacated seat 
was filled by Francis Messerly (R-Cedar Falls) in a special election. Democrats’ election 
spoils claimed five Republican state offices, its first since 1938, and six of the seven U.S. 
Congressional seats.119 The only Republican to survive the onslaught was Representative 
H. R. Gross who defeated Stephen Peterson (D-Waterloo) by only 419 votes. Petersen 
held over a 5,000 vote lead in Black Hawk County, but that slowly dwindled away as the 
rural vote came in and solidified another term for the Republican.120   
Social scientists and historians have analyzed a shift in the American voter 
between the 1960 and 1964 elections. Prior to the Eisenhower years, many American 
voters relied on partisan affiliation in casting their votes for president. Party affiliation 
sustained through each generation based on habitual, family traditions and social identity. 
The average voter showed little knowledge of policy and the political party served as the 
anchor to the individual’s political position.121 The shift from Eisenhower to Kennedy to 
Johnson, which culminated in the Goldwater/Johnson election, involved new set of voters 
who were not tied to political party. These voters were concerned with rising social issues 
of racial and gender equality, social welfare, and the expanded role of the federal 
government. Professor Norman H. Nie and his colleagues observed, “The American 
public has been entering the electoral arena since 1964 with quite a different mental set 
119 “Iowa Demos Score Biggest Vote Victory,” Waterloo Daily Courier, November 4, 1964. 
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than was the case in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They have become more concerned 
with issues and less tied to their parties.”122 
 
 
Political Activism’s Successful Decline 
With its newly found majority, the labor movement took up one final campaign to 
overturn Iowa’s right to work law and to establish an agency shop in its place. Labor 
leaders wrote in the platform at the Democratic State Convention a plank that suggested, 
“…the Democratic Party of Iowa recommends action to repeal the so-called right-to-
work law” without the knowledge or approval of Governor Hughes.123 Governor Hughes 
did not want to jeopardize the party’s newly found majority. He had to keep in mind the 
relations between businessmen (IMA) and farmers (IFBF) within his administration. He 
opened the new legislature in 1965 by suggesting pro-labor modifications to Iowa’s labor 
laws instead of an outright repeal of the right to work law. In 1976, Lieutenant Governor 
Fulton recalled the tense situation within the Democratic party, then: “Labor, of course, 
was very influential with the Democrats and, in 1965, we had a knock-down, drag-out 
fight over who was going to run the party: the Governor and the party organization or the 
labor halls.”124 
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 Governor Hughes supported a three-bill plan that looked to achieve labor’s 
objective in overturning the state’s right to work law. The first measure called for the 
legalization of the union shop. It stipulated that an employer could only hire union 
members or if an employee is hired outside the union, they would need to become a 
member and pay union dues in a set timeframe. The second bill proposed a commission 
to mediate and prevent labor disputes mirroring the NLRB. The third challenged the 
state’s anti-secondary boycott law, which prevented unions from pressuring neutral 
companies to halt business with another company under strike.125 The Governor argued 
“Either we believe in collective bargaining or we do not. To me, this is the point on 
which it all hinges,” and directed the legislature to grant labor “the dignity of fair 
partnership in the industry and business future of Iowa…instead of treating them as a 
distrusted and ill-favored stepchild.”126 The union shop bill first passed the House, but 
failed in the Senate by 31-27. Seven Democrat senators, majority of whom were in rural 
districts, voted against the bill.  
 Mike Adams, UAW Local 838 member who worked at the John Deere Waterloo 
Tractor Works as a sheet metal presser, vividly recalled the defeat and showed the 
frustration that many union members shared that day: 
In 1964, when we had the people, we was supposed to have the most Democrats 
in Iowa, we couldn’t get the right-to-scab law repealed. And one of those goddam 
Democrats that was head of the right-to-scab law today was one of the Senators 
125 “Demos Still Hope for Two Labor Laws,” Waterloo Sunday Courier, May 23, 1965. 
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from Boone that voted against us. The AFL voted against us on this agency shop 
because they wanted the union shop. And, hey, they’ve got [an open] shop.127  
 
Jack Seeber, electrician at the Waterloo Tractor Works and UAW Local 838 President 
from 1973 thru 1975, also shared Adams’s assessment that the divide between the AFL 
and CIO from the UAW caused the failure of the bill to pass. Seeber remembered the 
Democrats who, earned labor’s support in their elections, went against the unions on right 
to work: 
A gentleman by the name of Francis Messerly, who labor had split on after half 
the locals had endorsed him. The Packinghouse Workers and some others had 
endorsed him. Local 838 had not. He had promised to vote for repeal. Also a 
gentleman from Cedar Rapids had had the endorsement of labor in that area and 
had promised to vote for repeal. When it came time to vote they both deserted 
us.128 
 
The failure to repeal or modify the right to work law became the breaking point in 
Waterloo local’s political activism. The unified front could not be sustained with 
differing interest on solving labor laws in Iowa. In 1965, Reuther withdrew the UAW-
CIO from the AFL-CIO. Buhle argued that Meany’s tight grip over the executive 
committee and their differing views on social reform, including Civil Rights and the 
Vietnam War, led to Reuther’s breakaway.129 The state and locals followed suit in 1968. 
127 Clare (Mike) Adams with Cecil Pierce, Waterloo, Joint Interview by Merle Davis, June 18, 
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The UAW-CIO in Iowa withdrew from the IFL, AFL-CIO and the BHUC.130 The local 
unions’ successful political activism would not survive this institutional divide. 
 Many UAW Local 838 leaders saw the power their union had in Waterloo and felt 
the smaller AFL unions and other locals took advantage of the numbers and money they 
contributed to the BHUC. Cecil Pierce, a UAW Local 838 divisional steward at the 
Waterloo Tractor Works, provided this assessment of the Local’s involvement in political 
elections, “I mostly just base it on UAW, that we went out and worked like hell, and we 
ended up behind the eight ball. We furnished the leg work and the money, and they 
[AFL] took the credit.”131 Carl Dahl, UAW Local 838 President, tried to restrain the 
divisiveness that emerged between the Local 838 and AFL unions. He recalled, “I’ve 
always had trouble with 838 due to their size. They get cocky. ‘We pay the most money. 
We’re going to have all the say-so.’ I said, ‘You got to have a little compassion. You got 
to be tolerant. You got to help the little guy a little.’”132 
The division between labor organizations jeopardized union solidarity in Iowa, 
especially in Waterloo. The UAW Local 838 was the largest union by membership and 
was heavily invested in leadership roles within both the IFL, AFL-CIO and BHUC. Its 
withdrawal from those organizations contributed to labor’s failure to repeal or modify the 
state’s right to work law, despite having the largest Democratic majority in Iowa’s 
130 UAW Local 838, Our History, 63. 
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history. The landslide victories in 1964 were all but erased in the 1968 election. The 
nation’s sentiment against the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War, along with 
civil unrest in the country, led to significant victories for the Republican Party. In Iowa 
the Republicans regained the statehouse electing Robert D. Ray as governor and gaining 
the rest of the state offices under the GOP ticket. Black Hawk County’s GOP followed 
the statewide trend and swept all the courthouse offices up for election and won all but 
two of the state representatives on the ballot. Fred Nolting (D-Waterloo), supported by 
labor, survived re-election for state representative.133 
 A union’s role in political activism is necessary for it to be successful within the 
community and the state. Beyond organization and representation, political activism 
provided a rationale for union membership. The 1948 UPWA strike and the 1950 UAW 
strike solidified each local’s presence within its respective companies, albeit a shaky one 
for Local 46 and Rath’s. The local unions showed their strength in negotiation, 
bargaining, and solidarity by achieving long term contracts that capitalized on majority of 
its members’ concerns. This success left union membership in flux. Between 
negotiations, what benefit did the union provide in maintaining an active membership? 
That purpose presented itself through a political awakening after the state’s passage of its 
right to work law in 1947.  
 The victories achieved by the leadership and solidarity of the Local 838 members, 
from the 1948 election to 1964, became their demise. One consequence was due to the 
133 “Ray Leads GOP to Statehouse Sweep,” Waterloo Daily Courier, November 6, 1968.; “GOP 
Wins County with 2 Exceptions,” Waterloo Daily Courier, November 6, 1968. 
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unions’ campaign for its members to register Republican in the 1948 gubernatorial 
primary. It created an opening for the membership, who were slightly conservative 
themselves, to be Union Republicans rather than Union Democrats. It took a joint effort 
by all locals, CIO and AFL, to rectify and rebuild a labor coalition that supported 
candidates who would back organized labor in the community and the state.  
Waterloo unions’ determination to be represented led to the creation of the 
voluntary based Waterloo Coordinating Council that included representation from AFL, 
Teamsters, and CIO local unions. Even though the International Unions AFL and CIO 
formally merged in 1955, Waterloo’s commitment to unity among its locals led Black 
Hawk County to be the first official merged entity under the new AFL-CIO. Union 
political activism here hit its peak in 1964. The unions’ strong opposition to the Shaff 
Plan played a part in the large Democrat landslide in 1964. Labor made concerted efforts 
to place the repeal of the state’s right to work law at the top of the Democrat agenda.  
However, this goal was not shared by Democrat leaders, Governor Hughes and 
Lieutenant Governor Fulton. The Democrat’s strong majority gave labor the optimism 
that they could finally achieve its ultimate goal. This unraveled with the divisiveness 
within the party on whether to repeal right to work or modify it through positive labor 
legislation. Both tactics failed in session and played a part in the decline of the unions’ 
united political activism. 
Over the next decade Waterloo had limited labor representation at the city and 
state level and faced combative primaries on who earned labor’s support. Without a 
strong, unified coalition, Waterloo slipped back under Republican control and this led to 
63 
a decreased labor representation at the state level. Richard Price, UPWA Local 46 
member and Chief Steward from 1969 to 1979, recalled the dissatisfaction: “Seems like 
our biggest problem in the county, the City of Waterloo, we can’t correlate our beliefs 
and ideas jointly with the UAW. We have lost candidates that would’ve won the goddam 
thing if we’d got together.”134 The election 1964 resulted in the success the local unions 
strove for in their efforts for political activism. However, that success did not produce the 
result they truly wanted. It led to dissention among the locals and instability in the 
community of Waterloo.  
The unions suffered political limitations from anti-communist sentiment at the 
height of McCarthyism and rising social issues around the Vietnam War and Civil Rights. 
But this did not prevent unions from improving the social welfare of its community and 
membership. The role of community outreach is the third foundation that defined the 
success of Waterloo unions. This is explained in the next chapter that focuses on one 
example when Local 838 organized to assist needy families at the height of another 
economic downturn, known as the farm crisis.  
134 Richard Price, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 9, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
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COMMUNITY OUTREACH AND THE “BROWN BAGGERS,” 1970-1990 
 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the United States’ farm economy hit record yields 
and high land prices. These yields resulted in surpluses that could not be consumed by the 
market. As the surpluses increased, prices started to drop. Farmers could not sell their 
crops or land, agriculture manufacturers’ production slowed, and the nation faced another 
economic crisis, known as the Farm Crisis. During the height of this crisis, the 
community of Waterloo struggled to feed and support its needy families, particularly 
those who were facing layoffs and waning benefits. The Cedar Valley Food Bank and the 
UAW Local 838 “Brown Baggers,” another social aid organization, were both crucial in 
offering necessary supplies to those in need. But only the Food Bank became a staple 
resource in the Waterloo community in the last decade of the twentieth century.  
In 1985, a second grader at Kinglsey Elementary wrote the following essay after 
her class finished a canned food drive for the Salvation Army.   
Once my neighbor lost her job. I didn’t help her, but a cloud came right up to me 
and said, ‘You should be nicer. I’ve seen lots of people lose their jobs and after 
awhile they lose their house. They don’t have any food. They can’t buy anything 
and it’s all because they don’t have any money and nobody helps them.’ ‘You’re 
right,’ I said, ‘I am being selfish.’1  
 
This vivid realization underscores the vast impact the economic downturn in the 1980s 
had on the community. Community service and relief agencies were overwhelmed by the 
number of needy families asking for assistance during this period, and the farm crisis 
 1 Cindy Kranz, “Metro Area Student are Pitching in to Give Assistance to Those in Need,” 
Waterloo Courier, February 22, 1985. 
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caused some to restructure their outreach to weather the storm. The full impact of the 
farm crisis on Waterloo has yet to be studied, but the UAW Local 838 Brown Baggers is 
worth exploring.  
 This chapter expands on the third foundation, community outreach, for union 
strength and solidarity. It argues that the Brown Bag Committee did more than provide 
food for needy community members. It served a social and cultural role, affirming 
connections between the community of Waterloo and the UAW Local 838. The chapter 
addresses two main questions: What effect did the UAW’s Brown Baggers have on 
union-community relations? And, what contributed to the later decline of union visibility 
in the community? When Waterloo officials later partnered with a citywide food bank, 
the result shifted focus away from the Brown Baggers and decreased the visibility of the 
union’s social impact on the community. 
By the late 1970s, Iowans had experienced at least a decade of positive economic 
growth under Governors Harold Hughes and Robert Ray. The state held a surplus of 
about $30 million in its general fund, and industrial production surpassed $8 billion.2 
Farmers mentality shifted and saw their farms not as a “way of life,” but as a business. 
William A. Hewitt, chairman of Deere & Company, called this new type of farmer “the 
businessman farmer.”3 Between 1970 and 1981, the value of farm acreage increased from 
$300 to $1700 nationally. In Iowa, the value of an acre could go as high as $3200. 
Farmers took advantage of this prosperous time and expanded their land holdings, 
 2 Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa: The Middle Land (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1996), 303. 
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purchased new equipment, and harvested a surplus of crops that was supported by the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).4 
 
Origins of the “Brown Baggers” 
Large farmers were not the only ones producing a surplus. Roger Bleeker, a 
foundry worker at John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, noticed his garden and those in 
his neighborhood grew more vegetables than could be consumed by a single household. 
The surplus was left to rot or be thrown away. Bleeker shared his concerns about the 
rotting produce with a group of his friends at Buck Hill Tap, a local tavern.5 The group 
noticed that people who were handicapped or elderly could not easily grow their own 
gardens and would be a perfect group to receive the extra fruits and vegetables. So the 
group organized a collection of the surplus and by word-of-mouth created a 
clearinghouse in the back of a station wagon that served as a mobile food transport, 
delivering to those in need around their neighborhood.6 
The popularity of this organization quickly outgrew the back of the station wagon, 
and Bleeker turned to the UAW. In 1974, Bleeker joined the UAW Local 838 and by 
1977 was a member of the union’s community service committee. This committee 
 4 Schwieder, Iowa: The Middle Land, 316. 
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expanded its primary focus of helping union members during strikes, to being visible on 
all community boards and partnering with other non-profit organizations.7 Bleeker saw 
an opportunity for the community service committee to sponsor a new program involving 
his surplus produce. He proposed his idea with the intentions of someone taking it up and 
organizing the efforts. But, as he recalled, “They dropped it right back in my lap and said 
it sounded like a good idea.”8 So Bleeker became chairman of the group that soon began 
calling itself the “Brown Baggers,” named after the brown bags used to store produce.9 
The Brown Baggers’ connection to labor helped the program establish credibility 
within the community. Its visibility increased and so did donations. Within its first year 
of operation, the Brown Baggers collected five tons of food to aid the elderly and needy 
in Waterloo.10 Bleeker described the range of people, who donated items to the union 
hall: 
High-ranking company officials. We’ve got union officials. We have people come 
in…[that are] plain rank and file people. We have people come off the street with 
absolutely no affiliation with John Deere or with organized labor.11 
 
The union’s outreach to the broader community created a relationship that only continued 
to expand and grow in the subsequent years.  
 7 Bleeker, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, May 19, 1982, ILHOP, Transcript, 3. 
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 The Brown Baggers took every opportunity to broaden their resources and 
developed a relationship with community subgroups. Bleeker felt the union could benefit 
by partnering with the Hawkeye Valley Area Agency on Aging, directed by Chris 
Harshbarger. This established agency, within the Waterloo community, provided direct 
services to the elderly, including “transportation, congregate and home-delivered meal 
services, income assistance, and legal advocacy.”12 Harshbarger described the newly 
formed partnership as a natural fit. Together they were able to broaden their reach and 
make sure the necessary recipients received the donations collected by the Brown 
Baggers.  
 Harshbarger recalled one event that reflected the character and drive Bleeker 
upheld as chairman of the Brown Baggers. In the summer of 1979, he returned to his 
office from a meeting in Grinnell and noticed something unusual, 
When I came back to the office I pulled up the alleyway where I usually parked 
my car, and there was a bit of activity. So I got the car parked, and it must’ve 
been about 90 degrees in the shade. I went to come into the Center, and I heard 
this clucking and pecking inside the door. I looked in the door and here were 
probably two hundred live chickens tied leg-to-leg, two to a bundle, sitting in the 
back door of the Senior Center, with probably two hundred people fluttering 
about, playing Bingo.13 
 
Bleeker used these chickens as a produce donation for the Brown Baggers, but when 
word got out there were not enough to distribute to all who wanted them. The next best 
thing was to organize a “Chicken Bingo” and distribute the clucking prizes to the lucky 
winners. The Brown Baggers consistently brought in large amounts of food to be shared 
 12 Bleeker, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, May 19, 1982, ILHOP, Transcript, 6. 
 
 13 Bleeker, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, May 19, 1982, ILHOP, Transcript, 8. 
 
                                                          
69 
 
with the elderly and needy, ranging from fifteen to twenty bushels of apples to truckloads 
of sweet corn. As the program grew, so did demand. 
 In the early years of the program, Bleeker faced a shortage of manpower to 
upkeep the committee’s four community gardens in the metro area. In 1982, the 
committee reported that their members planted “700 cabbage plants, 560 tomato plants, 
200 pounds of potato seeds, 152 hills of muskmelon and 32 pounds of onion sets” across 
the four gardens.14 This level of produce could not be left unmaintained, so the Brown 
Baggers relied on volunteer hours from committee members, John Deere retirees, and a 
unique group: juveniles on probation. Before the Brown Baggers, Waterloo established a 
program that allowed juveniles to volunteer their labor as payment for wrong doings in 
the community 
This program was called VPOAs or volunteer probation officer aides. Members 
were described, by the Waterloo Courier, as “ordinary people - factory workers, 
businessmen, housewives, college students - who are working on a one-to-one basis with 
youngsters in trouble.” VPOAs provided kids, who were first offenders or who 
committed lesser crimes, such as “shoplifting, petty larceny, [and] vandalism,” an 
opportunity to connect with an individual in the community, two hours a week, who 
showed an interest in the child’s life. In 1976, nearly 560 people were trained as 
VPOAs.15 In the following year, the program shifted from the Volunteer Bureau to the 
Juvenile Court Services, which revamped the program under the name, “Alternative 
 14 Roy Postel, “Food Program Nurtured by Cooperative Effort,” Waterloo Courier, July 4, 1982. 
 
 15 Jim Wigdahl, “Volunteer Aides Help Youngsters in Trouble,” Waterloo Courier, June 20, 1976. 
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Community Services.” The volunteer services supervisor, Steve Smith, explained that 
this new program “offers concrete repayment to society, community involvement and 
awareness, a possible sense of accomplishment for the youth and accountability for the 
juvenile court with minimal expense.”16  
Bleeker partnered again with Harshbarger and Julia DaLaRosa, an information 
and referral counselor with the Hawkeye Valley Area Agency on Aging, to develop a 
relationship with the Black Hawk County Juvenile Court Services.17 The Brown Baggers 
and the Agency secured thirty-five juveniles to maintain the four community gardens in 
1981. By the second year, it was estimated forty juveniles worked about 350 collective 
hours in the gardens. The youth were credited $2.75 an hour that went to their restitution 
of damages and also counted towards work-project hours.  
Bleeker noted that this was a fun program for both the juveniles and retiree 
volunteers who supervised the kids. He made the youth aware that “it’s a lot better to be 
out in a garden working with a grandparent than it is down in the basement of the 
Courthouse cleaning out a john.” Bleeker felt “You got to keep it fun. You got to make 
sure that you don’t destroy human dignity, because a lot of times the people that come to 
us the only thing they got left is their pride. You don’t take that from them.”18The effects 
of the farm crisis challenged Bleecker’s humility and tested the strength of the Brown 
 16 “Young Offenders are put to Work,” Waterloo Courier, January 30, 1977. 
 
 17 Bleeker, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, May 19, 1982, ILHOP, Transcript, 12-13. 
 
 18 Bleeker, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, May 19, 1982, ILHOP, Transcript, 17-18. 
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Baggers. Necessities, besides food, became scarce for families including: clothes, shelter, 
and a strong support system.  
As the Brown Baggers expanded their resources to meet the needs of the 
community, they also expanded the fact that the local government was not doing enough 
to meet either the farm crisis or the food shortage. Soon the organization was not alone in 
its effort. The Family and Children’s Council of Black Hawk County and the Family 
Services League sponsored a “Pulling Together” meeting on Friday, November 19, 1982. 
The organizers mailed four hundred invitations to community members, leaders, and 
other groups to collectively organize in order to provide sufficient resources to needy 
families during the upcoming holiday season. The Waterloo Courier reported that 140 
people attended the meeting at the Westminster United Presbyterian Church representing 
“service agencies, churches, schools, Local 838, organizations, the Extension service, 
Cedar Valley Food Bank, the Waterloo Recreation and Arts Center, and Hawkeye 
Institute of Technology.”19 
Waterloo Mayor Leo Rooff, who represented the city at this meeting, pledged that 
“whatever the city can do, within the law, the city will do.” The organizations in 
attendance also made a similar pledge to help the groups each represented. The Local 838 
committed to help with food drives, clothing drives, and counseling services.20 Following 
this meeting the Brown Baggers quickly went to work. The leaders stuck to the tested and 
 19 Bettie Ferguson, “Black Hawk Countians Pull Together to Help,” Waterloo Courier, November 
21, 1982. 
 
 20 Bettie Ferguson, “Black Hawk Countians Pull Together to Help,” Waterloo Courier, November 
21, 1982. 
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true model of community subgroups. In two months, they partnered with the St. Vincent 
DePaul Society and organized a clothing drive providing “clothing, shoes and linen 
available to unemployed or low-income people who are having to use their funds on other 
needs, such as food and heating.”21 They collected donations on Wednesday, January 19 
and distributed them over the next two days. Waterloo residents read on the front page of 
Thursday’s Waterloo Courier, “Clothing Drive Response Exceeds Expectations.” In the 
article, Bleeker said, “We got more clothing than you could ever imagine…I knew we’d 
have a fair turnout. But not in my wildest imaginations did I think we’d have a turnout 
like this.” Community members and Iowans, as far away as Waukon, donated thousands 
and thousands of articles of clothing at the UAW Local 838 union hall.22  
The numbers of donations were equaled by the hundreds of families who lined up 
in the winter cold to benefit from this service. In the initial two-days of the drive, 1,075 
families claimed clothing. Due to the high turn-out, Bleeker continued the program into 
the following week, providing opportunities on Monday and Tuesday that assisted an 
additional 783 families. The total drive aided 6,358 people from Northeast Iowa.23 
Following this success, Brown Baggers and the St. Vincent DePaul Society organized 
another clothing drive at the UAW Security House during the first week of December in 
1983. This drive outfitted 7,476 people. Bleeker commented on the efforts stating,  
 21 “Clothing Drive Materials Gathered,” Waterloo Courier, January 18, 1983, Picture. 
 
 22 David Avery, “Clothing Drive Response Exceeds Expectations,” Waterloo Courier, January 20, 
1983. 
 
 23 David Avery, “Thousands Give, Thousands Receive During Clothing Distribution Drive Here,” 
Waterloo Courier, January 26, 1983. 
 
                                                          
73 
 
There are a lot of children and adults who are much warmer today than they were 
last week…And they are much warmer thanks to the generosity of the Waterloo-
Cedar Falls community. This area may be a large one, but it is small enough to be 
caring.24  
 
The remaining items were then shipped to Cedar Rapids for local distribution.  
  
Farm Crisis: Brown Baggers Successful Decline 
The Brown Baggers substantially impacted Waterloo early in the farm crisis; but 
another entity began to organize and offer similar services with a larger focus, the Cedar 
Valley Food Bank. The food bank officially opened its doors on December 9, 1981, after 
ten months of planning. City officials, community members, and church leaders made up 
the multiple committees tasked in structuring the establishment of the food bank. The 
committee members included: Mayor Rooff, Chris Harshberger, Rabbi Sol Serber, Pastor 
Bob Ward, and ten others in community.25  
The food bank distributed its first donations to families or community members 
referred from local churches or the Operation Threshold outreach office. It had enough 
donations to assemble emergency food boxes that contained a three-day supply of food. 
The food bank received its initial donations from “several churches, Immaculate 
Conception Elementary School in Gilbertville, Allen Memorial Hospital, Deere & Co. 
and Operation Threshold.”26 The Cedar Valley Food Bank was wholly devoted to social 
 24 “1,844 Households Benefit from Clothing Drive Here,” Waterloo Courier, December 5, 1983. 
 
 25 “Food Bank Structure Eyed,” Waterloo Courier, May 22, 1981. 
 
 26 “Deposits are All in Place, Food Bank Opens Doors,” Waterloo Courier, December 9, 1981. 
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welfare. In contrast, UAW Local 838 was a labor organization and bargaining agent first 
and community welfare organization second. Thus it would soon become clear that the 
Brown Baggers were no longer necessary. 
 Within a two-day period in its first month of operation, the food bank received 
forty referrals for emergency food boxes and aided 124 people. This grew to an average 
of 200 referrals a month, doubling the food bank’s initial prediction of up to 100 families 
a month.27 Monetary donations also increased with awareness and by December 20, 
Reverend Jack Boelens, president of the Cedar Valley Food Bank board of directors and 
pastor of First Presbyterian Church, reported $9,514 in cash contributions received from 
churches, civic groups, and individuals. With the rapid increase in demand, unfamiliarity 
with handling numerous cash donations, and limited supplies, food bank officials sought 
assistance in developing their management and administrative processes. They partnered 
with Operation Threshold as the primary administer and financial recorder, but received 
assistance from “Black Hawk Lutheran Ministries, the County Relief Office, the Brown 
Bagger program and Hawkeye Valley Area Agency on Aging.”28 
 This partnership, although temporary, began to shift the Brown Baggers food 
drive responsibilities towards the city sponsored and supported food bank. Through 1982, 
the Brown Baggers were an important resource to the Waterloo community. From 1983 
thru 1987, the Brown Baggers felt the impact of the Farm Crisis as John Deere drastically 
 27 “Food Bank Gets Funds from Group,” Waterloo Courier, March 25, 1982. 
 
 28 “Funds from Civic Foundation, Anonymous Donor Lift Food Bank,” Waterloo Courier, 
December 20, 1981. 
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reduced its workforce through layoffs and shutdowns. John Deere’s workforce, in 1979, 
was 16,160 Waterloo employees. By October 1985, it had decreased to 7,109 wage and 
salaried employees. 4,371 of whom were still laid off and an additional 1,685 employees 
returned to their jobs without their previous seniority.29 Across the state, manufacturing 
jobs declined to 18.3 percent of the workforce in 1987, which reflected a 4.7 percent loss 
from 1979.30  
Even Bleeker could not escape from the “pink slip” and was out of work for two 
years, lining up for a brown bag of his own.31 As a result of the continued hard times, the 
UAW Local 838 increasingly turned its focus away from providing charity to the broader 
community and focused on the original function of the community service committee: to 
provide services during strikes or in this case major layoffs. The massive layoffs limited 
the union’s foundational functions. It could not sustain all three roles needed for 
solidarity and strength. Instead, charitable community outreach became relegated to 
members only; while the union’s organization and representation function focused on its 
ongoing unemployed workers who were quickly running out of union and unemployment 
benefits. 
 In December 1983, 3,500 of the 4,000 idled union members registered to receive a 
ham or turkey for the holidays. The union, along with the Family Auxiliary 273 of Local 
838, collected donations outside the gates of all five John Deere facilities. This donor 
29 Ed Adcock, “Deere to Idle 480 Employees,” Waterloo Courier, October 3, 1985. 
 
30 Schwieder, Iowa: The Middle Land, 318. 
 
31 Goldman, “For Hungry Families, Help in Brown Bags,” 62. 
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drive generated $9,000, enough for the union to purchase $10 food certificates 
redeemable at a metro supermarket by unemployed workers who had used up their 
benefits. Despite the lay-offs at the Deere plants, the Brown Baggers partnered with St. 
Joseph’s Catholic Church to sponsor a food pantry. As Bleeker put it in a Waterloo 
Courier article, this service provided “emergency food for low-income families and low-
income elderly until they can begin receiving assistance from other service agencies.”32 
The Brown Baggers shifted from a leadership to supportive role in the community. It 
allowed other resources, like the Cedar Valley Food Bank, to take over its once 
prominent position providing social services for the Waterloo community.  
The following year, the UAW and Deere & Company created “Care and Share” 
program to offer assistance “for communities in Iowa and Illinois where John Deere 
facilities are located”. The company offered to match up to $100,000 worth of food and 
monetary donations collected by the employees. Items collected in Waterloo would be 
distributed through the Salvation Army and the Cedar Valley Food Bank. Gordon 
Tjelmeland, Deere & Company spokesman, commented that “through ‘Care and Share,’ 
all Deere employees have the opportunity to show again that they do care about their 
friends and neighbors of the entire community in which they work and live.”33 This 
program sponsored over 100,000 meals that helped laid-off employees, but it also 
32 Bettie Ferguson, “Union Local Reinforces Effort to Help Jobless,” Waterloo Courier, December 
11, 1983. 
 
33 “Deere Teams with Workers to Aid Needy,” Waterloo Courier, January 10, 1984. 
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expanded to seven agency pantries outside Black Hawk County, according to Ruth 
Toney, director of the food bank.34  
The efforts to help fellow employees continued into December. The John Deere 
Component Works Plant Engineering Department raised more than $1,700 at their third 
annual Christmas benefit auction to help thirty Brown Baggers and their families. Cathie 
Rose, chairman of the Christmas project, commented that “this year we wanted to help 
our own people who aren’t as fortunate as those of us who are still working.” The thirty 
families received a basket “containing food, clothing and toys along with a ham or turkey 
for their Christmas dinner.”35  
 Union members and John Deere employees greatly benefited from this 
community relationship they had created. However, Bleeker reflected on Waterloo’s 
continued struggles stating: “You can give away so many food baskets, open up so many 
clothes closets, but if the family has lost their home and is sitting in a snow bank, it is just 
not enough.”36 His feelings of frustration and hopelessness echoed those shared by the 
second grader at Kingsley Elementary. These sentiments affected the effectiveness of 
community resources, including the Brown Baggers and the Cedar Valley Food Bank, 
over the next two years. 
34 Sara Summerhays, “Community Help for Needy Emphasized,” Waterloo Courier, February 1, 
1985. 
35 “Deere Unit Helps Needy Families,” Waterloo Courier, December 20, 1984. 
 
36 Bettie Ferguson, “Union Local Reinforces Effort to Help Jobless,” Waterloo Courier, December 
11, 1983. 
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 In the summer of 1984, the food bank neared desperation as supplies dwindled 
and cash was quickly depleted. Director Toney told the Waterloo Courier: “The problem 
is ‘just getting worse’ and the food bank cannot be expected to carry this entire load 
without community support in the form of food or money donations.”37 This plea for help 
was answered by the city six months later. Waterloo’s new mayor, Del Bowers, 
organized the “Warm Your Heart…Help with Food and Fuel” campaign, asking citizens 
and local businesses to raise $300,000 to be split between the Cedar Valley Food Bank 
and Operations Threshold. Bowers suggested that “all citizens should take an active part 
in the observance of community needs by, among other things, volunteering their support 
to assist the numerous human service agencies as they strive to relieve the suffering and 
needs of many individuals and families in our city.”38  
The Waterloo Mayor’s call-to-action received positive responses from diverse 
organizations in the Waterloo-Cedar Falls area including: Black Hawk Democrat and 
Republican Parties, Hawkeye Chapter of the American Red Cross, University of 
Northern Iowa, UNI Student Association, Black Hawk County Union Council (AFL-
CIO), The Waterloo Fire Department, John Deere Community Credit Union, and College 
Square Mall. All these organizations, and many others, developed friendly competitions 
to raise funds, held food drives and money drives, and organized volunteers.39 
37 Julie Herman, “Food Bank Supplies, Cash Running Out,” Waterloo Courier, July 5, 1984. 
 
38 Sara Summerhays, “Community Help for Needy Emphasized,” Waterloo Courier, February 1, 
1985. 
 
39 “Citizens, Organizations Pitching in to Help Drive,” Waterloo Courier, February 1, 1985. 
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 The community rallied around the Cedar Valley Food Bank and supported its 
services in Black Hawk County and its surrounding areas. Increasingly, the community 
shifted its focus away from the UAW Local 838 and the Brown Baggers in support of the 
city sponsored food bank. The Waterloo Courier continued to cover the needs of the food 
bank, but fewer and fewer headlines on stories about the Brown Bag Committee. The last 
headline on the Brown Baggers in the Waterloo Courier occurred on April 16, 1984: 
“Agency honors Brown Baggers, ‘Helping Hands’.” The article discussed the Hawkeye 
Valley Area Agency on Aging’s recognition of the Brown Baggers as one of two 
recipients of their Community Service Award.  
The award was “for demonstrated accomplishments through programs that benefit 
the elderly as a whole and showed new methods subsequently adopted by other 
organizations.” The Agency highlighted the Brown Baggers’ expansion of service 
beyond the elderly noting: “The program was instrumental in initiating the government’s 
distribution of surplus food, a biannual clothing drive, distribution for needy families, and 
in having volunteers available for other tasks, such as helping people move.”40 The 
Courier’s description of the program in past-tense only added to the notion that the 
Brown Bag Committee had become disassociated with the community as an active 
organization, while community support increased around the Cedar Valley Food Bank. 
 In 1986, the national magazine Newsweek honored Roger Bleeker as one of the 
United States’ “100 New American Heroes,” because of his work with the Brown 
40 Steve Salato, “Agency Honors Brown Baggers, ‘Helping Hands’,” Waterloo Courier, April 16, 
1948. 
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Baggers. This was not Bleeker’s first recognition for his role. He received the Waterloo 
Crossroads Ford’s VIP in 1981, winning a “two-tone brown pickup truck” that he put to 
use continuing to build the Brown Bag Committee.41 In 1982 he received the President’s 
Volunteer Action Award from President Ronald Reagan.42 Peter Goldman, in his 
introduction to the Newsweek article on the list of honorees, wrote: 
A hundred latter-day heroes walk the pages that follow, a hundred men, women 
and children whose deeds of bravery, will and self-sacrifice have made us better 
as a people…They are unencumbered by medals and gold brain and unsung 
beyond their local papers…Some have devoted their own lives and meager 
fortunes to reducing the sum of suffering in the world, feeding the hungry, 
sheltering the homeless, comforting the sick and aged; they bear daily witness to 
Camus’s observation that plagues help human beings rise above themselves.43  
 
This “plague” Bleeker bore witnessed to, as did Waterloo and agricultural states, was the 
farm crisis. The impacts of the crisis affected more than the paycheck. Waterloo’s unions 
would no longer be as visible in the community. This is seen by the ability of the Cedar 
Valley Food Bank to supplant a nationally recognized program created by the UAW 
Local 838. 
 The Cedar Valley Food Bank celebrated its tenth anniversary in the summer of 
1991. The food bank served 351 individuals in its first year, which could be 
overshadowed by the Brown Baggers five tons of produce it collected in its first year. But 
in ten years the food bank served “485,000 clients and 11 million pounds of food.” Its 
services expanded from the low-income and church referrals to elderly care, emergency 
41 “Bleeker Cited for Community Work,” Waterloo Courier, December 9, 1982. 
 
42 Dan Dundon, “‘Unsung Hero’ Gain Newsweek Recognition,” Waterloo Courier, June 15, 1986. 
 
43 Peter Goldman, “100 New American Heroes,” Special Issue, Newsweek, Summer 1986, 47. 
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need-based-aid, and children for food services. It also included social welfare activities 
such as the Metro Clothes Closet, the Adopt-A-Family program, the Holiday Tree 
program, and the commodity foods give-away.44 The food bank services completely 
absorbed the programs started by the Brown Baggers and created unintentional 
competition during the Farm Crisis. 
           Providing such social programs was not a competition. Yet if visibility was a key 
to union power, the UAW Local 838 Brown Baggers program, along with the union, was 
increasingly eclipsed by other agencies. The impact of the Brown Baggers on Waterloo 
was significant to the charities and services currently operating in the community. Chris 
Harshbarger, in a 1982 interview, said this about Bleeker and the Brown Baggers: 
But the full gamut of goods and services and supplies that the Brown Bag 
program now is able to deliver to people has enriched the quality of life, not just 
for them but for the rest of us, and I think it’s changed in the minds of an awful lot 
of people in the general public just what organized labor is. It’s not a group of 
guys who collect themselves together around the bargaining table to push up 
wages so that the company can’t make a profit, and if anybody complains they 
give them a rap on the skull. It’s really a bunch of guys that are our neighbors and 
living across the street and helping each other. Now banding together to help the 
entire community at a time when our economy is suffering pretty greatly.45 
 
The union mentality of collective action that came through in the Brown Baggers could 
not be sustained. The city supported the Cedar Valley Food Bank, which could not be 
challenged by the Brown Baggers, who were depleted in numbers and resources by 1990. 
44 Gwenne Culpepper, “Cedar Valley Food Bank Celebrates 10th Anniversary,” Waterloo Courier, 
July 28, 1981. 
 
45 Bleeker, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, May 19, 1982, ILHOP, Transcript, 11. 
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The food bank grew in numbers and outreach. In 2016, it operates under the name 
Northeast Iowa Food Bank.  
The UAW Local 838 still recognizes the Brown Bag Committee as one of its 
fifteen active standing committees, along with Civil & Human Rights, Community 
Services, and Consumer Affairs.46 But the Brown Baggers’ involvement is not as visible 
in the community as it once was. In the mid-1980s, Waterloo unions pushed for social 
changes that were not being addressed by the city. The Brown Baggers succeeded in 
helping community members receive their needed food and supplies. Similar to the 
unions’ political successes from 1948 to 1964, community outreach also led to its 
decline. The community could not sustain both groups, and the Brown Baggers slipped 
from the public eye. The union lost another key foundation that would have continued to 
shape public opinion on the benefits of organized labor and union activity. By the 1990s, 
Iowa started to diversify its economy by expanding beyond agriculture. And the unions’ 
focus shifted back to the bargaining table to rebuild its organization and representation 
function with a depleted labor force and membership.  
 The three foundations for union strength succeeded in Waterloo, but also worked 
to the detriment of its solidarity. Community outreach and political activism led the 
working class to be aware of social and political issues in its community. This newly 
expanded self-interest allowed workers to be independent from the union’s agenda, but 
they still received the benefits of the union’s organization and representation function. 
46 UAW Local 838, “Committees,” UAW Local 838, http://www.uawlocal838.com/statistics/ 
(accessed August 2016). 
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This shift created a crack in the union’s solidarity that, in part, led to the decline of the 






 The recent history of unionization during the Cold War and the expanded analysis 
of public unions in the twenty-first century showed unions decline through success. From 
the 1950s through the 1970s, union were strong, because of three foundational areas. 
Unions’ core existence relied on organization and representation. Membership would not 
grow, if the union did not successfully bargain with the employer. Employees elected 
leaders to negotiate on their behalf to achieve a shared agenda. That agenda often 
included improved benefits, workplace safety, addressing grievances, and wage 
increases. Waterloo unions saw success in this area with long-term contracts that in turn 
led to increased membership. While establishing its organization and representation 
presence, Waterloo leaders ushered their new masses towards political activism. 
 The gains not achieved through contracts could be accomplished in political 
activism. The passage of Taft-Hartley created a political awakening among union leaders. 
They realized that the success achieved in organization and representation could be 
erased through state and federal action. Waterloo locals organized together, under the 
Black Hawk Union Council, and implemented a shared union goal of electing candidates 
supporting labor’s presence in Waterloo. Their collective means resulted in successful 
results culminating in the sweeping landslide election of 1964. Waterloo labor achieved 
political representation in the midst of the Cold War, anti-communist sentiment, the 
heightened tension over Civil Rights, and the Great Society. 
 In this same environment, Waterloo’s community faced social unrest. Inaction by 
the city government allowed the union locals to initiate solutions that addressed the social 
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welfare of the community. In one example, Local 838 established the “Brown Baggers” 
that provided elderly and needy families with produce and other supplies. This program 
grew, not only in members, but the community’s awareness of the lack of food for low-
income and retired individuals. Waterloo unions sponsored other social programs 
including: the teen club - Teenage Jive Joint (TAJJ), a free community blood bank, the 
Equal Opportunity Committee and expanded the unions’ presence in the United Way.1 
Local unions’ community outreach provided positive visibility for unions in Waterloo 
and defined them beyond the role of organization, representation, and bargaining.  
 John Cooney defined a union man in 1981, as “a man that will stand up not only 
for his rights in the shop or on the job, but he will stand up for other people’s right. If he 
sees someone else offended, being taken advantage of, he will help do something about 
it. He is generous man. He is an honest man, and he is a good worker.”2 Gene Condon 
added another perspective stating, “Even in the worst time of the most rabid politicking 
we listened and we talked. We can say anything we want to. The freedom that we have as 
men, as UAW men and women, it’s unexplainable. And we love it.”3 Both Cooney and 
1 A. W. “Rusty” Lubert and Ruth Lubert, Waterloo, Joint Interview by Merle Davis, July 2, 1981, 
Iowa Labor History Oral Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 18-37.; Paul M. Larsen, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 15, 1981, 
Iowa Labor History Oral Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 33-36.; Roosevelt Taylor, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 8, 1981, 
Iowa Labor History Oral Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 11-15.; Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity & Survival: An Oral History of Iowa 
Labor in the Twentieth Century (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1993), 294-299. 
 
2 John Cooney, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 16, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
38. 
 
3 Gene Condon, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, June 11, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
35. 
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Condon expressed the sense of awakening felt by union leaders around the mission of 
community outreach and political activism. But that recognition would shift for rank-in-
file members away from the union agenda to one of individual control. 
 After unions achieved long-term contracts, its membership fluctuated in the years 
between contract negotiations. Union leaders turned to political activism to keep their 
members united behind their collective agenda and to ensure political allies in local, state, 
and federal government. The success in electing labor leaders failed to produce desired 
legislation and reform in the short lived Democrat majority in the mid-1960s. The rise of 
the social voter allowed individuals to break from party coalitions or special interests 
groups and become informed by their own merit. This shift led to the splintering of 
Waterloo’s BHUC and the differing views shared between the labor organizations.  
 Success in community outreach also affected labor’s strength and solidarity. 
Local 838’s nationally recognized “Brown Baggers” program suffered setbacks that led 
to a decline in the union’s visibility in the community. The city’s support for the Cedar 
Valley food bank inadvertently created competition addressing the same concerns in 
Waterloo. The effects of the Farm Crisis crippled the Brown Baggers. They could not 
keep pace with the expanding food bank and slipped from the public eye by the 1990s. 
Community outreach, political activism, and organization and representation created a 
strong and solid union in Waterloo. The unions created an active membership that 
branched from the labor agenda to seek out their own interests.  UPWA Local 46 




Well, of course, my original concept of union was brothers and sisters taking care 
of each other. We’re far from that philosophy today. Everybody’s taking care of 
themselves, I think. You know, we’re not holy. Hell, it used to be if you needed 
volunteers you got volunteers. Today it’s, “What will you pay me on lost time?” 
And that’s the difference. When we were an infant, growing up, before we got to 
be fat cats, we were negotiating better. We were fighting for survival, fighting to 
get not a mile but an inch, and, hell, we did everything together. We’ve gotten 
over being brothers and sisters. That’s the basis of a union, you know, to do the 
Golden Rule, have others do unto you. What I’m saying is that’s gone in all 
unions.4  
 
Price was not alone in his assessment. Jack Seeber, UAW Local 838, also offered 
hesitation on the union’s solidarity noting, “If there’s one thing that I get concerned about 
is I hope we don’t ever lose our sense of brotherhood or sense of togetherness that 
brought the labor movement where it is. Because if we ever do, we can go back down.”5 
By the 1990s, Seeber’s thoughts evolved into reality. The political awakening of union 
members, which was a direct result of union activities between the late forties and mid-
eighties, led to a great strengthening of workers’ political identities. As it turned out, 
there political identities were far more individualistic than collective. For many scholars 
this was an unfortunate loss. For many workers it was part of their political awakening. 
This shift left vulnerable the labor movement in Waterloo, which went into a long period 
of decline by the end of the 1980s.    
 
 
4 Richard Price, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 9, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
70-71. 
 
5 Jack Seeber, Waterloo, Interview by Merle Davis, July 15, 1981, Iowa Labor History Oral 
Project, Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Transcript, 
54. 
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AFTERWORD 
HARRIS V. QUINN: A NEW PRECEDENT FOR LABOR? 
 
 The effects of the 1980s Farm Crisis severely restricted rural and small 
communities, especially the agricultural based economy of the Midwest. Urban centers 
continued to outpace the growth of rural areas when people left the farms for a stable 
income. From 1983 to 2015, the number of all wage and salary workers grew from 88.3 
million to 133.7 million. However, this increase in the labor force was not shared by 
organized labor. During this time, union membership decreased by 2.9 million or 11.1 
percent of those employed in 2015, a decline 20.1 percent from 1983.1 Within this 
decline, the private sector felt the most impact with a shift from 16.8 percent membership 
rate in 1983 to 6.7 percent in 2015. The public sector has consistently held membership 
rates around 35 percent, over five times higher than the private sector.2   
The three foundations that applied to Waterloo unions: organization and 
representation, political activism, and community outreach, could also be used to 
understand public sector unions. Like the private sector, the strength of public sector 
unions can be tied to their political activism and community outreach. This chapter 
argues public sector unions’ success in political activism created a special interest force 
that led to their failure from the U.S. Supreme Court rulings. By expanding their political 
strength, it allowed individual members to express their own self-interest over the 
1 Megan Dunn and James Walker, “Union Membership in the United States,” U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics: Spotlight on Statistics (September 2016): 2. 
 
2 Dun and Walker, “Union Membership in the United States,” 4. 
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collective agenda. The Court set a new precedent in Pamela Harris’s 2014 challenge to 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the State of Illinois. The ruling 
effectively created a quasi-right-to-work state in Illinois only for a select group of 
employees. It could cause the public sector to see the same decline experienced by the 
private sector in the 1980s.  
The case, Harris v. Quinn (2014), narrowly asked if members of a federal and 
state, jointly-funded program’s agency fee, or “fair share fee” requirement is 
constitutional under the First Amendment free speech rights. This challenged the long 
standing ruling set by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) which allowed some 
infringement on the First Amendment. In 2014, the Court ruled along its ideological 
divide of 5-4 in favor of the plaintiffs. The majority concluded that the agency fee, due to 
its limited employment relation with the state, infringed upon the employees’ First 
Amendment rights. It suspended forty years of stare decisis, and opened a potentially rich 
path for challenges to public sector labor unions. 
 The Harris ruling dominates the current debate on public labor relations. Scholars 
have predicted its impact will extend beyond the public sector to include implications for 
private sector unions. Criticism has focused on the very limited decision by the majority 
and its abrupt dismissal of Abood as an “anomaly.” Professors of law, lawyers, judges, 
and other academics tended to support Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent upholding Abood 
and the necessity of an agency fee to support union practices, even if it does not align 
with all individuals employed. In contrast, Harry Hutchison, law professor at Wayne 
State University, defended the majority’s decision along economic lines using a 
90 
combined analysis of postmodernism and public choice. He suggested the “solidarity” 
proclaimed by unions is smoke and mirrors that drives away community support and is 
replaced by a select group of leaders who make decisions in their interest in lieu of the 
membership’s.3  
Hutchinson’s argument is based on Richard Rorty’s postmodern concept arguing 
that the increase in diversity does not create a sense of solidarity, rather subgroups driven 
by individual identities to promote self-interest goals over a majority suggested 
outcome.4 Change to organized labor stems from self-interest over collective objectives. 
In another way, the defense of maintaining solidarity through an agency fee does not 
promote community of workers. This puts in jeopardy the unions’ foundation of political 
activism. Without a unified collective agenda, the strength of a union diminishes. 
 Labor history is significantly covered by many historians, social scientists, and 
other professional fields from the early nineteenth-century through the late twentieth. The 
modern era of U.S. labor history law starts with the passage of the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) during the Second New Deal. Congress stipulated that collective 
bargaining is to be recognized by employers and established legal remedies for private 
organizations. A “switch in time” saved numerous New Deal statutes, including the 
NLRA. The Court’s shift allowed labor to establish private sector unions that could be 
supported and upheld under law.  
3 Harry G. Hutchinson, “A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues Dispute with 
First Amendment Values,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 14, no. 4 (2006): 1309-1401. 
 
4 Hutchinson, “A Clearing in the Forest,” 1332-1336. 
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The NLRA built upon the 1914 Clayton Act and 1926 Railway Labor Act (RLA), 
amended in 1934. Both provided certain provisions for labor unions existence within the 
private sector, but the legislature, executive and judiciary stopped short of extending 
bargaining and representative rights to the public sector. Even President Franklin 
Roosevelt had reservations. In a 1937 letter to the President of the National Federation of 
Federal Employees, he wrote: “The very nature and purposes of government make it 
impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in 
mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The employer is the whole 
people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representative in Congress.”5 The 
concerns of employees’ connection to public policy is a consistent inhibitor for collective 
bargaining. 
The NLRA significantly changed the landscape of the workforce by establishing a 
generally balanced relationship between management and labor.  Major provisions of the 
act included the formation of the National Labor Relation Board, list of unfair labor 
practices, bargaining agreements for increase in pay and workplace safety, and approved 
strike practices.6 Congress in 1947 proposed amendments to curb some of the union 
provisions and offered relief to employers. The Taft-Hartley Act offered a list of unfair 
union practices, forbade federal employees to strike, and ended closed-shops, while 
supporting a union-shop only if a state did not prohibit the practice through right-to-work 
5 Ashley Brompton, “Harris v. Quinn’s Paradoxical Relationship with Past Union Jurisprudence 
and the Path to the Future,” Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law 15, no. 3 
(Spring 2015): 515. 
 
6 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2015). 
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legislation.7  The last provision, right-to-work, is the root of the issue in one of the first 
significant case in labor history.   
Railway Employees v. Hanson (1956) challenged the 1951 amendment to the 
Railway Labor Act that allowed union-shops, such as the one established by the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company. The union-shop required all employees to pay an agency fee 
regardless of membership. A group of employees argued the RLA amendment violated 
the right-to-work provision in the Nebraska Constitution and the state supreme court 
upheld that argument. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, a request for 
appeal. The heard the case on the provision if the amendment to the RLA was “germane 
to the exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.”8 Congress’s power of commerce 
provided permissible regulations and the 1951 amendment “‘stabilized labor-
management relations’ and thus furthered ‘industrial peace.’”9  
The unanimous ruling, delivered by Justice William O. Douglas, supported 
Congress’s commerce powers over Nebraska’s state rights provisions guaranteed through 
Taft-Hartley. This case faced a challenge under the First Amendment, but the lack of 
infringement due to the early appeal provided no evidence to claim political or 
ideological engagement against members’ own ideals. Justice Douglas wrote, “On the 
 
7 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (2015) or Taft-Hartley Act 80 H.R. 
3020, Pub. L. 80–101, 61 Stat. 136, enacted June 23, 1947. 
 
8 Railway Employees’ Department, American Federation of Labor, et al. v. Hanson et al., 351 
U.S. 225, 234-235 (1956). 
 
9 Pamela Harris et al. v. Pat Quinn, Governor of Illinois, et al., 573 U.S.     , 134 S. Ct. 2618, 
2328 (2014). 
                                                          
93 
present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment right 
than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member 
of an integrated bar.”10 
 Justice Douglas later recanted his Hanson conclusion in the plurality opinion of 
Lathrop v. Donohue (1961).  The Justice’s dissent concluded that his previous First 
Amendment analogy failed, because if it was implemented, “we sanction a device where 
men and women in almost any profession or calling can be at least partially regimented 
behind causes which they oppose.”11 Justice Douglas continued, “Unless we so treat it, 
we practically give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional people into 
goose-stepping brigades. Those brigades are not compatible with the First 
Amendment.”12  His heightened dissent mirrored the extreme discontent some labor 
lawyers and professionals had with using the First Amendment to support unions. 
Lathrop did not provide a significant remedy for labor, but, in the same year, the Court 
heard another case that expanded the Hanson ruling. 
Employees of the Southern Railway System in Georgia appealed, under the First 
Amendment, that their union dues were improperly used on political and ideological 
activities that they did not support.  The case Machinists v. Street (1961) supported the 
RLA union-shop provision, but the Court saw merit in prohibiting political or ideological 
expenditures to protect employees’ free speech and expression rights. The Justices 
 
10 Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 238. 
 
11 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2629 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 884 (1961)). 
 
12 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2629 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 884-885 (1961)). 
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stipulated the provision, “is to be construed to deny the unions, over an employee’s 
objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he 
opposes.”13  The majority offered two remedies: First, a union member could request an 
injunction against the union for planning to spend a portion of their dues that violated 
their free speech right. They would then receive reimbursement of the projected cost. Or 
the union could offer restitution from spending a portion of the employee’s dues, after 
they notified the union of their objection, on certain political or ideological activities.14 
Justice Hugo Black’s dissent heavily criticized the majority’s remedy, stating “I 
think the remedy suggested by the Court will work a far greater interference with the 
union's bargaining activities because it will impose much greater trial and accounting 
burdens on both unions and workers.” He continued: the remedy “promises little hope for 
financial recompense to the individual workers whose First Amendment freedoms have 
been flagrantly violated.”15 The Justice defended the autonomy of unions and its structure 
of “voluntary membership”, but the influence of Government, supported in Hanson and 
now Street, puts the status of ‘voluntary membership’ at risk for stricter Constitutional 
review.16  Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice John M. Harlan, offered a dissent 
counter to Justice Black. He favored returning to Hanson and saw no violation of the 
First Amendment, arguing “No one's desire or power to speak his mind is checked or 
 
13 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769-770 (1961).  
 
14 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 774-775. 
 
15 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 780, 795-796 (Black, J. Dissent) 
 
16 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 780, 796-797 (Black, J. Dissent) 
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curbed. The individual member may express his views in any public or private forum as 
freely as he could before the union collected his dues.”17   
Both Hanson and Street established clear boundaries for private sector unions, but 
the public sector continued to be neglected in collective bargaining rights. This shifted 
when President John F. Kennedy in 1962, issued Executive Order 10988 that expanded 
collective bargaining rights to most public sector employees on noneconomic issues. 
Many states from 1965 to 1976 followed suit by passing state legislation expanding 
provisions for state employees, both economic and noneconomic.18  This sweeping 
change to labor law led to quick challenges in the courts, the first being in 1977.   
A group of teachers, members of the Detroit Federation of Teachers Union, 
challenged the union’s agency-shop clause. It required “every teacher who had not 
become a Union member within 60 days of hire…pay the Union a service charge equal to 
the regular dues required of Union members. A teacher who failed to meet this obligation 
was subject to discharge.”19 The plaintiffs argued that a substantial portion of those dues 
would fund union “activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, 
scientific and religious in nature of which [they] do not approve, and in which they will 
have no voice.”20 The Court’s unanimous decision, delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, 
did not agree with the plaintiffs’ argument that Hanson and Street dealt solely with the 
 
17 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 797, 806 (Frankfurter, J. Dissent) 
 
18 Brompton, “Harris v. Quinn’s Paradoxical Relationship,” 515. 
 
19 Abood, et al. v. Detroit Board of Education et al., 431 U.S. 209, 212 (1977). 
 
20 Abood v. Detroit Board of Ed., 431 U.S. 212-213. 
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private sector and that this case is different since it dealt with the public sector.  The 
Court recognized that there are different responsibilities between the two employers, 
suggesting that political clout may provide greater influence on public employees and 
that “decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process.”21  
However, the Justices ruled that Hanson and Street were applicable and upheld 
the union-shop agreements based on two primary functions: the desirability of “labor 
peace” and the problem of “free riders.” As they saw it, these functions were substantial 
reasons to permit the collection of an agency fee from non-union members. The 
limitation offered in Street comes from spending, not from an employer’s public or 
private organizational status.  The Court created two areas for expenditures: chargeable 
(collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment)22 or 
nonchargable (political or ideological purposes).23  The 1983 Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision, in Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, et. al, further 
stipulated that “due process” is required in collecting fees so  “the procedure must make 
reasonably sure that those employees’ wages will not be used to support any union 
activities that are not germane to collective bargaining, whether or not the activities are 
political or ideological.”24 The Supreme Court upheld the Appeals Court, ruling the 
 
21 Abood v. Detroit Board of Ed., 431 U.S. 227-229. 
 
22 Abood v. Detroit Board of Ed., 431 U.S. 232. 
 
23 Abood v. Detroit Board of Ed., 431 U.S. 236. 
 
24 Annie Lee Hudson, et al. v. The Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, et al., 743 F. 2d 1187, 
1194 (7th Circuit 1984). 
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union’s practices “failed to provide adequate justification for the advance reduction of 
dues, and…failed to offer a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial 
decisionmaker.”25 This led the Court to stipulate a mandatory notification for all 
employees informing the charges due for both members and nonmembers and a period 
for nonmembers to “opt out” of certain dues, from the agency fee, designated for political 
or ideological purposes. 
In Lehnert v. Ferris (1991), the Court further defined chargeable activities 
stipulating they “must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified 
by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) 
not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of 
an agency or union shop.”26 Even with these narrowed provisions, Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s dissent argued that “each one of the three "prongs" of the test involves a 
substantial judgment call (What is ‘germane’? What is ‘justified’? What is a ‘significant’ 
additional burden?) it seems calculated to perpetuate give-it-a-try litigation of monetary 
claims that are individually insignificant but cumulatively worth suing about.”27 Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning offered a warning to the Court that this decision might lead to 
increased judicial review of unnecessary First Amendment appeals, because of the cases’ 
Constitutional challenge to the First Amendment. Abood and Lehnert continued to define 
 
25 Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO, et al. v.  Hudson et al. 475 U.S. 292, 309 
(1986). 
26 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2633 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991)). 
 
27 Lehnert v. Ferris, 500 U.S. 551 (with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter join, and with 
whom Justice Kennedy joins as to all but Part III-C, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part.) 
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and regulate both public and private sector unions building a substantial precedent in the 
area. 
Not until the Knox v. SEIU (2012) decision did Abood face a serious challenge. 
SEIU, Local 1000 wanted to collect additional funds and temporary suspend the monthly 
dues cap in order to support a campaign against two special ballot issues in California 
that directly targeted the union. All members were informed of this decision via a mailed 
notice, but nonmembers were not given an option to opt-out outlined in Hudson.28 The 
petitioners sued SEIU for violating their First Amendment right, because of the 
mandatory payment. The case was initially upheld in the District Court, but overturned 
by the Ninth Circuit. The three member court ruled the mandatory dues were a fair 
overreach on the First Amendment, because the unions sent out the required notice of 
expenditures.  
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and by a 5-4 majority; Justice Samuel 
Alito delivered the opinion, arguing that the union failed to provide an accurate notice 
with an option to “opt-out” of the payment. He argued, “Acceptance of the free-rider 
argument as a justification for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues 
represents something of an anomaly – one that we have found to be justified by the 
interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’29 But it is an anomaly nevertheless.”30 This led to his 
 
28 Hudson v. The Chicago Teachers Union, 743 F. 2d 1187 (7th Circuit 1984). 
 
29 Chicago Teachers Union v.  Hudson, 475 U.S., 303. 
 
30 Dianne Knox, et al. v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S.     , 132 S. 
Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012). 
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remedy of “opting into” payment rather than a form of reimbursement from the union. 
This decision dramatically altered decades of jurisprudence that followed the “opting 
out” solution as seen in Street and expanded through Abood, Hudson, and Lehnert. 
Justice Alito suggested, “acceptance of the opt-out approach appears to have come about 
more as a historical accident than through the careful application of First Amendment 
principles.”31  
Justice Alito subtly questioned the effectiveness of Abood’s handling of First 
Amendment challenges to the public employer agency shops, writing “the compulsory 
fees constitute a form of compelled speech and association that imposes a ‘significant 
impingement on First Amendment rights.’”32 He continued, “Our cases to date have 
tolerated this ‘impingement,’ and we do not revisit today whether the Court's former 
cases have given adequate recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake.”33  
The Court did not answer that question in 2012, but two years later it resurfaced in 
Harris.  
 The Harris decision followed the same structure outlined in Knox, questioning 
Abood’s role in public unions and their ability to assess First Amendment claims. The 
Court mirrored the exact split in Knox, and Justice Alito expanded on that decision to 
further cement his distrust in Abood. Many scholars saw this case as cut and dried, 
 
31 Knox v. SEIU, 132 S. Ct. 2290. 
 
32 Ellis et al. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & 
Station Employes et al. 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984). 
 
33 Knox v. SEIU, 132 S. Ct. 2289. 
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believing that it would support collective bargaining rights for Illinois public employees. 
Those initial views swiftly changed after oral arguments focused on the merits of 
employment rather than the significance of Abood. The employment status of the 
personal assistants in the Illinois Homecare System caused the majority to negate Abood. 
They further supported the compelling interest standard highlighted in Knox.  
In 1984, Illinois passed the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) and the 
Illinois Educational Labor Relation Act (IELRA). These laws authorized public 
employees’ collective bargaining, grievances, strikes, and arbitration. The state 
legislature vigorously debated the two pieces of legislation and faced amendatory vetoes 
from Governor James R. Thompson. Under IPLRA, two provisions played a key role in 
the case: coverage and the fair share requirements. The coverage provision, stipulated 
under Section 3(m), limited an employer to be “any individual employed by a public 
employer, including interns and residents at public hospitals…”34 Furthermore, a public 
employer was defined as, someone employed by: 
the State of Illinois; any political subdivision of the State, unit of local 
government or school districts; authorities including departments, 
divisions, bureaus, board, commissions or other agencies of the foregoing 
entities; and any person acting within the scope of his or her authority, 
express or implies, on behalf of such entities in dealing with its 
employees.35  
 
34 Sally J. Whiteside, Robert P. Vogt, and Sherryl R. Scott, “Illinois Public Labor Relations Law: 
A Commentary and Analysis,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 60, no. 4 (October 1984): 883-884. 
 
35 Whiteside, “Illinois Public Labor Relations Law,” footnote 1. 
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This provision strictly defined an employee and an employer in Illinois, 
furthermore it qualified who could participate in collective bargaining agreements 
and union memberships.  
 Illinois never passed the right to work legislation legalized under Taft-Hartley that 
made the closed shop illegal. Instead, the state implemented an agency shop with a fair 
share requirement, stipulating that this would be 
proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, 
contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and 
other conditions of employment, but not to exceed the amount of dues 
uniformly required of members. The amount certified by the exclusive 
representative shall not include any fees for contributions related to the 
election or support of any candidate for political office.36  
 
This provision craftily included the exclusion of political contributions or expenditures of 
union dues on political activity, as required by Abood. In debate, State Senator Terry L. 
Bruce explained the explicit limitation on fair share stating, “We drew this language right 
from the Abood case, you cannot make political contributions. The only thing you can ask 
[non-union members] to pay is the cost of collective bargaining, contract administration, 
matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment, that is it.”37  
 The state made sure to follow the constitutional limitations for public employees 
set by the Supreme Court, but according to some observers the law left gaps in its 
effectiveness. Senator Roger A. Keats, proposed an amendment to require the disclosure 
of all union’s funds to the Illinois Labor Relations Board including annual reports, by-
 
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch 48, Paragraph 1603, Section 3(g) (2013) 
 
37 Whiteside, “Illinois Public Labor Relations Law,” footnote 264, page 924-925. 
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laws, and listing of scheduled dues. This was not supported by the other Illinois 
legislators, because they felt the law should not be hindered by such a burden that could 
easily be amended by future legislatures, if the problem arose.38 The inability to define a 
clear procedure for determining the amount of the fair share did not only fail in debate, 
but it also fell short of the guidelines in Hudson. A 1984 analysis of the law concluded 
that it made strides in improving Illinois public sector labor, but that it failed to resolve 
continuing conflicts.39  
 In 1985, the Service Employees International Union petitioned the State Labor 
Relations Board to represent the personal assistants under the Home Services Program 
established by the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities Act as public employees 
stipulated by IPLRA.  The State Labor Relations Board denied this request because 
“Illinois does not exercise the type of control over personal assistants necessary to be 
considered, in the collective bargaining context envisioned by the Public Labor Relations 
Act.”40 That decision seemed to put the issue at rest, but in 2003 Governor Rod R. 
Blagojevich signed Executive Order 2003-8, recognizing personal care assistants, both 
rehabilitation and disability, as employees of the state only for collective bargaining 
rights on the justification that “it is essential for the State to receive feedback from 
 
38 Whiteside, “Illinois Public Labor Relations Law,” 927. 
 
39 Whiteside, “Illinois Public Labor Relations Law,” 932. 
 
40 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2625-2626. 
                                                          
103 
personal assistants in order to effectively and efficiently deliver home services.”41 
Governor Blagojevich made certain to support the State Labor Relation Board’s 1985 
decision by reassuring that “personal assistants are not State employees for purposes of 
eligibility to receive statutorily mandated benefits because the State does not hire, 
supervise or terminate the personal assistants,” defined as a “unique” employment 
relationship by the Board.42  
 The Illinois State Legislature followed upon the Governor’s executive order by 
amending the IPLRA. The amendment granted collective bargaining rights for all 
personal assistants and authorized the collection of a “fair share fee” from those who did 
not wish to join the union.  Under Illinois’s Home Services Program, a federal subsidized 
Medicaid program, the state offered patients (customers) the opportunity to receive in 
home treatment instead of being institutionalized. Many customers chose to have a 
spouse, parent, or close relative take on this role as personal assistant to provide the 
necessary care.  Illinois Home Services was divided into two programs: rehabilitation and 
disability.  Patients served as the customer and were responsible for the hiring and firing, 
daily supervising, disciplining, and agreeing to terms and duties of employment through a 
Service Plan.  None of these responsibilities were controlled or influenced by the State.  
The personal assistant was paid a standard rate set by the legislatures, which was also 
subsidized by federal Medicaid. 
41 Illinois Governor, Executive Order no. 2003-8, “Executive Order on Collective Bargaining by 
Personal Care Assistants,” State of Illinois Executive Department (March 4, 2003) 
https://www.illinois.gov/Government/ExecOrders/Pages/2003_8.aspx (accessed April 2016). 
 
42 Illinois Governor, Executive Order no. 2003-8.  
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 After the 2003 amendment to the IPLRA, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana 
filed a petition to represent the personal assistants under the rehabilitation program. The 
personal assistants voted in favor of SEIU’s request and were recognized by the State 
Labor Relations Board. Personal assistants under the disability program did not accept a 
bargaining unit and rejected representation in 2009.  Between 2003 and 2010, 
rehabilitation personal assistants paid an agency or “fair share fee” that added up to $3.6 
million annually.43 This proved too much for Pamela Harris and nine other care 
providers. They challenged the law as being in violation of the First Amendment. 
The original suit was filed in District Court against Governor Pat Quinn, who 
succeeded Governor Blagojevich after his impeachment and removal from office in 2009. 
District Court Judge Sharon Johnson-Coleman found the suit moot since Harris was 
employed under the disability program and no union collected an agency fee from any of 
those personal assistants.  She ruled in favor of the state against three of the plaintiffs, 
who were employed under the rehabilitation program, citing Abood’s precedents that 
allowed the collection of an agency fee.  The case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit 
Court in 2011. It upheld Harris’s “unripe” claim, but remanded it back to the district 
court to dismiss without prejudice due to a lack of jurisdiction. The court expanded Judge 
Johnson-Coleman’s decision ruling that the personal assistants under the rehabilitation 
program are joint employers and can be required to pay an agency fee for the interest of 
stable labor relations, as suggested in Abood.44  This affirmation led the plaintiffs to 
43 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2626.  
 
44 Pamela Harris, et al. v. Governor Pat Quinn, et al., 656 F. 3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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appeal to the Supreme Court in 2014 where the Justices heard arguments on the question, 
whether the First Amendment permits a State to compel personal care providers to 
subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a union that they do not wish to join or 
support? Or conversely, does compelling someone to pay union fees, which can be used 
for union activities with which they disagree, in any way, deny them their freedom of 
speech? 
 After oral arguments were heard on January 21, 2014, the Court announced its 
decision at the end of June. It ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.  Justice Alito wrote for the 
5-4 majority and concluded that “the First Amendment prohibits the collection of an 
agency fee from personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program who do not want to 
join or support the union.”45 This overturned the lower court’s decision, but it also 
affirmed Harris’s “unripe” claim against the disability program. The majority restated its 
opinion against Abood, found in Knox, as an anomaly further suggesting, “Abood itself 
has clear boundaries: it applies only to public employees. Extending those boundaries to 
encompass partial-public employees, quasi-public employees, or simply private 
employees would invite problems.”46 But Justice Kagan, in a dissent, argued that the five 
Justices focused too much on the terms of employment that were clearly defined by the 
Court of Appeals and supported in Abood, stating, “Each caregiver has joint employers – 
the State and the customer – with each controlling significant aspects of the assistant’s 
 
45 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2644. 
 
46 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2638. 
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work.”47 She concluded: “the government’s prerogative as employer,…, turns not on the 
‘formal status’ of an employee, but on the nature of the public ‘interests at stake.’”48 That 
interest is defended by the opportunity to provide individualized health services to the 
citizens of Illinois without baring cost for institutionalization and sacrifice of comfort. 
 The majority cast aside Abood, noting that case had no influence, and mandated a 
strict scrutiny test as outlined in Knox when there is an issue of compelled speech. Justice 
Alito found that the strict scrutiny test could not be applied to the agency provision 
because it did not even muster a compelling interest required by Knox. He denied SEIU’s 
claim that the agency fee provided stability while preventing free riders, something 
consistently upheld in the decades of previous cases. The Justice argued, “A host of 
organizations advocate on behalf of the interests of persons falling within an occupational 
group, and many of these groups are quite successful even though they are dependent on 
voluntary contributions.”49 This statement drew criticism by the dissenters, because the 
majority suggested unions could be more successful without the fair share provision.  
Justice Kagan countered that unions are not like interest groups due to legislation 





47 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2644, 2646 (Kagan, J. Dissent). 
 
48 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2648. 
 
49 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2641. 
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The law compels unions to represent – and represent fairly – every worker 
in a bargaining unit, regardless whether they join or contribute to the 
union. That creates a collective action problem of far greater magnitude 
than in the typical interest group, because the union cannot give any 
special advantages to its own backers.50   
The Court did not fully overturn Abood’s decision, but it continued to poke holes in its 
viability. 
 The lasting impact of Harris is still unclear, but some clarity was thought to 
emerge from the Supreme Court ruling in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association 
(2016). This most recent case asks if public employees, who are not members of the 
union, are constitutionally required to pay the agency fee as a condition of employment. 
It quickly moved through the lower courts due to the lack of authority by these courts to 
overturn Supreme Court precedent. Even though the Ninth Circuit of Appeals saw clear 
violation of Friedrichs’s First Amendment rights, the case was heard without oral 
arguments and petitioners asked to support the District’s decision to enter judgement on 
behalf of the unions.51   
The debate around Friedrichs was whether Harris would become an anomaly, as 
suggested by Justice Kagan, or will the slim majority, led by Justice Alito, finally 
establish a national right to work for all public employees. This argument shifted after the 
sudden death of Justice Scalia on February 13, 2016, leaving the Court balanced with no 
 
50 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2656-2657. 
 
51 Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. v. California Teachers Association, et al., No. 13-57095 23 (9th Cir. 
2014) 
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majority.52  Friedrichs was argued in January and decided in March. Justice Scalia’s 
vacancy was reflected in the Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court issued a per curium 
decision, a ruling in the name of the Court instead of individual Justices, that was 
affirmed by an equally divided Court.53 This ruling upheld the lower court’s decision in 
favor of the California Teachers Association leaving the debate between Abood and 
Harris untouched. 
In November 2014, Harvard Law Review’s “Freedom of Speech” section, raised 
the question: “Why is only this public-employee speech worthy of such extensive 
protection?”54 The initial impacts of Harris resulted in creating a quasi-right-to-work 
state for a select group of employees in Illinois. SEIU’s success in political activism and 
advocacy led to members challenging the foundation of organization and representation. 
If the Court continues to build on this ruling, public unions are at risk of losing its free 
rider protection, established by the NLRA. Essentially they would establish right to work 
for the public sector in all 50 states.  
 The effects of Harris are also measurable in statistics.  According to the United 
States Department of Labor, the SEIU of Illinois and Indiana have seen a drop in nearly 
30,000 registered members.  In 2013 the union reported 93,873 total members of which 
39% or 36,743 were nonmembers paying an agency fee.  After the ruling in Harris 
membership for 2014 dropped to 64, 206 total members with zero members paying the 
52 Adam Liptak, “Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79,” New York Times, 
February 13, 2016. 
 
53 Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. v. California Teachers Association, et al., 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 
54 “Harris v. Quinn,” Harvard Law Review 128, no. 1 (November 2014): 220. 
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agency fee.55  This rapid loss of membership and income shows the extent of how Harris 
and a broader decision in the current term could further hinder the survival of unions.  
The national labor statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a drop 
from 2013 when 39.6% of union members were in the public sector compared to 7.3% of 
the private56 to 35.2% and 6.7% respectfully, in 2015.57 
 Labor leaders created an awakening for member participation in politics and 
community, but could not maintain a unified force. The unions’ political clout hindered 
their ability to promote unity within the labor community. Harry Hutchinson concluded, 
“labor unions have become ‘special interest adjuncts’ to political allies while often failing 
to serve the actual interests of their memberships. Urgent legislative action and principled 
judicial decision-making should be seen as important elements of any effort that aims to 
decouple politics from collective bargaining.”58 Although Cynthia Estlund, NYU 
Professor of Law, shared the same enthusiasm for change, she differed in the method 
concluding, “the twentieth-century collective bargaining framework in which [unions] 
operate is in serious need of renovation” But, she adds, “these projects of reimagination, 
reform and reconstruction belong to the people – the workers, unions, employers, and 
 
55  Union Reporting History: 543-894 Service Employees Local Union Healthcare IL IN, United 
States Department of Labor, July 7, 2015, available at https://olms.dol-esa.gov/query/orgReport.do. 
 
56 Brompton, “Harris v. Quinn’s Paradoxical Relationship,” 516. 
 
57 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
February 12, 2015, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm#union. 
 
58 Hutchinson, “A Clearing in the Forest,” 1401. 
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others who care about their fate. It is not for the Supreme Court to start pulling pillars and 
beams out of the existing structure.”59  
 The question is can that be accomplished in a polarized political system?  The 
Supreme Court creates opportunities, under Chief Justice John Roberts, for Congress to 
fix dated legislation. But inaction persists. If unions need to transition to become more 
voluntary institutions to maintain legitimacy and influence in the workforce, who would 
sacrifice political influence for that result?  
 
59 Cynthia Estlund, “Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?” Michigan Law Review 114 
(November 2015): 234. 
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